Tom Caylor wrote: S_p > can be expressed by a finite number, since the substitution itself can > be expressed by a finite number (whatever is written on the tape/CD or > other storage/transmitting device).
Does your 'interpretation' of 'Yes doctor' leave open all assumptions about actual *instantiation* of S_p? You refer above to the 'tape/CD or other storage/transmitting device'. Is an additional act of faith required such that we trust the doctor not merely to leave S_p to gather dust on a shelf? Or, if he does cause the instantiation of S_p (even assuming it to be equivalent to S_c) in terms of some unconstrained choice among arbitrarily many machine 'architectures' (electronic, hydraulic, mechanical, Platonic, you-name-it) I am to further trust that my experience will remain invariant to the actual physical behaviour thus enacted? Or is the assumption of YD within a 'comp' that additionally assumes AR+CT supposed to subsume all the above issues, and if so why? How far do we up the ante here? David > As I remember it, my interpretation/expansion of the "Yes Doctor" > assumption is that 1) there is a (finite of course) level of (digital) > substitution (called the "correct level of substitution") that is > sufficient to represent "all that I am", and "all that I could be if I > hadn't undergone a substitution", and 2) we (including the doctor) > cannot know what the correct level of substitution is, therefore we > have to gamble that the doctor will get it right when we say "Yes > Doctor". > > Suppose that the level of substitution actually *performed* by the > Doctor is S_p. Denote the *correct* level of substitution S_c. S_p > can be expressed by a finite number, since the substitution itself can > be expressed by a finite number (whatever is written on the tape/CD or > other storage/transmitting device). We know what S_p is and it is a > *fixed* finite number. But since S_c (*correct* level) is totally > unknowable, all we "know" about it is our assumption that it is finite. > The next *obvious* step in the logical process is that the probability > that S_p >= S_c is infinitesimal. I.e. the probability that the doctor > got it right is zilch. This is because most numbers are bigger than > any fixed finite number S_p. > > So it seems that our step of faith in saying Yes Doctor in not well > founded. It's definitely a bad bet. > > It seems that we need a stronger statement than S_c is finite. > > Tom > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Le 21-août-06, à 07:11, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > > > > > > > It seems to me that there are two main sticking points in the > > > discussions on > > > several list threads in recent weeks. One is computationalism: is it > > > right or wrong? > > > This at least is straightforward in that it comes down to a question > > > of faith, in the > > > final analysis, as to whether you would accept a digital replacement > > > brain or not > > > (Bruno's "yes doctor" choice). > > > > Yes. Unfortunately this gives not a purely operational definition of > > comp. > > Someone could say yes to the doctor, just thinking that God exists, and > > that God is infinitely Good so that he will manage to resuscitate him > > through the reconstitution (he believes also God is infinitely > > powerful). > > So comp is really the belief that you can survive with an artificial > > brain *qua computatio", that is, through the respect of some digital > > relation only. > > > > > > > > > The other sticking point is, given computationalism > > > is right, what does it take to implement a computation? There have > > > been arguments > > > that a computation is implemented by any physical system (Putnam, > > > Searle, Moravec) > > > and by no physical system (Maudlin, Bruno Marchal). > > > > > > > > OK. To be sure Maudlin would only partially agree. Maudlin shows (like > > me) that we have: > > > > NOT COMP or NOT PHYSICAL SUPERVENIENCE > > > > But apparently Maudlin want to keep physical supervenience, and thus > > concludes there is a problem with comp. I keep comp, and thus I > > conclude there is a problem with physical supervenience. > > Actually I just abandon the thesis of the physical supervenience, to > > replace it by a thesis of number-theoretical supervenience. > > > > > > > The discussion about Platonism > > > and the ontological status of mathematical structures, in particular, > > > relates to this > > > second issue. Bruno alludes to it in several papers and posts, and > > > also alludes to his > > > "movie graph argument", but as far as I can tell that argument in its > > > entirety is only > > > available in French. > > > > > > That's true. I should do something about that. I don't feel it is so > > urgent in the list because there are more simple problem to tackle > > before, and also, most "MWI", or "Everything"-people can easily imagine > > the UD doesn't need to be run. But this is a subtle problem for those > > who have faith in their uniqueness or in the uniqueness of the world. > > Still you are right, I should write an english version of the movie > > graph. > > > > Bruno > > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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