Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Le 22-août-06, à 15:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > >>OK, I suppose you could say "I'm intelligent" but not "I + my >>environment are intelligent". >>That still allows that an inputless program might contain intelligent >>beings, and you are left >>with the problem of how to decide whether a physical system is >>implementing such a program >>given that you can't talk to it. > > > > People who believes that inputs (being either absolute-material or > relative-platonical) are needed for consciousness should not believe > that we can be conscious in a dream, given the evidence that the brain > is almost completely cut out from the environment during rem sleep.
Almost is not completely. In any case, I don't think consciousness is maintained indefinitely with no inputs. I think a "brain-in-a-vat" would go into an endless loop without external stimulus. >I > guess they have no problem with comatose people either. Comatose people are generally referred to as "unconscious". > Of course they cannot be even just troubled by the UD, which is a > program without inputs and without outputs. As I understood the UD the program itself was not conscious, but rather that some parts are supposed to be, relative to a simulated environment. > > Now, without digging in the movie-graph, I would still be interested if > someone accepting "standard comp" (Peter's expression) could explain > how a digital machine could correctly decide that her environment is > "real-physical". "Decide" is ambiguous. She could very well form that hypothesis and find much confirming and no contrary evidence. What are you asking for? a proof from some axioms? Which axioms? >If such machine and reasoning exist, it will be done > in Platonia, and, worst, assuming comp, it will be done as correctly as > the real machine argument. This would lead to the fact that in > Platonia, there are (many) immaterial machines proving *correctly* that > they are immaterial. Contradiction. Suppose a physical machine implements computation and proves relative to some axioms that physical machines don't exist. Contradiction? Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---