Le 22-août-06, à 05:53, Russell Standish a écrit :

>> This is a very interesting remark, although I am not convinced. I have
>> also believed for a while that a material universe could be saved by
>> the way the quantum multiverse actualizes the counterfactuals.
>> But if that were true, consciousness would not supervene on a
>> *classical* machine running deterministically an emulation of a
>> universal quantum turing itself running my brain, making comp false.
> I have put this to you in the past, but you have always responded that
> the multiple universes always emerges out of the UD, leaving me most
> confused as to whether I support the COMP position or not.

I think you are confusing two points. Indeed the many computations 
emerges right at the start from the AR part of comp.
Then a unique physical mutiverse appears from the UD reasoning.
But then, from the movie-graph or from Maudlin's Olympia argument, a 
possibility remains that a "real physical" mutltiverse emerges (real in 
the putative Aristotelian-Jones sense!).
But as I said, this moves does not succeed in justifying the "real" 
part of it (good because that notion of "realness" is quite vague to 
say the least).
We can come back on this latter, in some "movie-graph" posts, perhaps.

> Physical supervenience is not equivalent to assuming a concrete
> primitive material world. The latter is an additional assumption.

This depends entirely of what you mean by physical. If 
"physical-supervenience" alludes to the comp-physics, then ok. If this 
alludes to physics as understood by a aristotelian-matter physicist, 
then physical supervenience need it.
Maudlin talk only about supervenience. For him it is just obvious that 
comp makes it physical. Of course he is wrong there (or UDA contains an 
error, but this remains to be shown).
I have coined the term "physical supervenience", with "physical" having 
its standard aristotelian sense just to distinguish it with the 
comp-supervenience idea that mind relies on the immaterial computations 
(an infinity of them to be precise).



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