Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >> Peter Jones writes:
> >> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> >
> >> > > I can agree. No physicist posit matter in a fundamental theory.
> >> >
> >> > All physical theories are theories of matter (mass/energy).
> >> True, but they are not theories of what matter *actually is*.
> > Hence the need for a metaphysical account of
> > matter-as-Bare-Substance to complement the
> > physicst's account of matter-as-behaviour.
> If that is done isn't what you call metaphysics the 'actual physics' and
> the physicist's account of 'matter-as-behaviour' the metaphysics? Just a
> rhetorical terminological gripe.
The "meta" in "metaphysics" doesn't operate like the "meta" in
'The title of the work is Τῶν μετὰ τὰ φύσικα
(literally, "of the things after physics"). This is generally supposed
to mean that this is just a collection of works that later editors
placed after Aristotle's treatises on physics, but it may well mean
that the budding philosopher should study these subjects after studying
physical matters such as motion, time, and animal life.'
> Also, if the universe is treated as a mathematics ( of
> "matter-as-bare-substance" ), isn't the scientist its metamathematics,
> built of it? (With all the Godellian implications..) i.e. Scientists are
> what could be called the 'metamathematics of the noumenon'?
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