Hi Stathis,
Le 03-sept.-06, à 15:03, Bruno Marchal a écrit : > I think you mix the Mallah Putnam implementation problem, related to > the idea that any piece of matter could compute, and Maudlin's thought > experiment showing the incompatibility of the physical supervenience > thesis (that consciousness should supervene on the physical activity of > a computer running the computation) and computationalism (that > consciousness is invariant for a digital functional substitution made > at some level). I see you got the main argument right in other posts, so my comment was mainly pedagogical. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
