Hi Stathis,

Le 03-sept.-06, à 15:03, Bruno Marchal a écrit :

> I think you mix the Mallah Putnam implementation problem, related to
> the idea that any piece of matter could compute, and Maudlin's thought
> experiment showing the incompatibility of the physical supervenience
> thesis (that consciousness should supervene on the physical activity of
> a computer running the computation) and computationalism (that
> consciousness is invariant for a digital functional substitution made
> at some level).

I see you got the main argument right in other posts, so my comment was 
mainly pedagogical.



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