Le 03-sept.-06, à 17:18, David Nyman a écrit :
> > Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Maudlin build first a digital machine, let us call it M, which do a >> computation PI (Maudlin's name for it) which we suppose does >> correspond >> to a genuine consciousness experience (for example some remembering of >> the taste of cocoa). > > At this point we don't know whether the conscious experience is > supposed to: > > 1) inhere in the computation independent of physical instantiation > or > 2) inhere in some subset of the physical activity of the machine that > is supposed to be 'relevant' for the computation > > It seems that what is intended under 2) must be *any* physical activity > that could be construed as 'implementing' this computation, since > syntactically equivalent hardwares aren't constrained to any particular > set of physical activities. All right. > >> Suppose that during the running of that particular computation PI, the >> register r1, ...r67 are never used. Maudlin argue that if >> consciousness >> is attached to the physical activity relevant for the computation, we >> can retrieve those unused part of the computer, without changing the >> consciousness experience. > > OK, under either assumption 1) or 2) above. > >> He shows then that he can managed to build a version of M, >> proto-olympia (say) which has almost no physical activity at all when >> he follows the PI computation. > > But this will only preserve the conscious experience under the prior > assumption of its invariance to physical activity. Yes. OK. > If this invariance > is false we have a third possibility: > > 3) consciousness inheres in *specific* physical activities (and > consequently physically-instantiated comp is merely 'syntactic > simulation') Either those *specific* physical activities are turing emulable, and we are back to "1)" and "2)", or they are not, and then comp is false. Recall we assume comp. > > Under this assumption, changing the physical details of the > implementation might have any arbitrary effect whatsoever on the > original conscious experience. > >> Proto-olympia is *physically* accidentally correct for PI, but no >> more >> counterfactually correct. > > We don't know what effect the lack of counterfactuality would have on > the conscious experience. None, if 3) is correct. All right (but comp need to be false). > >> Then Maudlin reintroduces the unused parts, the Klaras, which >> reintroduces the counterfactual correctness, WITHOUT ADDING any comp >> relevant physical activity (if not, it would mean the level is >> incorrect(*)). > > Again, under 3) this wouldn't affect the conscious experience if the > relevant physical invariance is preserved. > > So comp + physical supervenience (phys-sup) would force >> us to associate any consciousness experience to any physical >> processes. > > Under 3) it would force us to associate specific conscious experiences > to specific physical processes, at the correct (physical) substitution > level. > >> And that would kill comp! So sup-phys -> NOT comp, or equivalently >> comp >> -> NOT sup-phys. > > Under 3) it would kill comp as a theory of the invariance of > consciousness to physical activity. Sure. > It would be possible for a physical > process that was conscious to be turing-emulable, but for the conscious > experience to be non-invariant to different instantiations of such > emulation. We would have zombie. Why not. Once comp is false ... > This would follow from the inherence of consciousness in > *specific* physical activities. I'm speaking here of comp as > instantiated in a *physical* machine, and consequently this is no > different to the claim that you can't drive a comp-emulated car down to > the shops (at least not the ones *outside* of the machine). The car you > need for your trip is non-invariant to turing-emulation. > > This is essentially the point I attempted to establish in my original > 'anti-roadmap' post. Assumption 3 claims that 'conscious' activity must > inhere in specific causal sequences seamlessly spanning the machine and > the world outside it. Without this, it is difficult to see how > 'consciousness' could be causally relevant to the intentional > interaction of the machine with its environment. > > As conscious machines ourselves we understand very well the difference > between the car we dream of (the 'emulated' Ferrari) and the one we > actually drive (the VW we causally interact with). OK in this situation. But comp makes impossible to distinguish the experience of driving a car, and the experience of driving a virtual car in a virtual environment, done at the right level of substitution (or below). Then the movie-graph or Maudlin's Olympia shows that machines cannot even distinguish a physical virtual environment and a purely arithmetical virtual environment. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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