Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Peter Jones writes: > > >>Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >>>Peter Jones writes: >>> >>> >>>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>>>>Now, suppose some more complex variant of 3+2=3 implemented on your >>>>>>>abacus has consciousness associated with it, which is just one of the >>>>>>>tenets of computationalism. Some time later, you are walking in the >>>>>>>Amazon rain forest and notice that >>>>>>>****under a certain mapping**** >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>>of birds to beads and trees to wires, the forest is implementing the >>>>>>>same computation as your abacus was. So if your abacus was conscious, >>>>>>>and computationalism is true, the tree-bird sytem should also be >>>>>>>conscious. >>>>>> >>>>>>No necessarily, because the mapping is required too. Why should >>>>>>it still be conscious if no-one is around to make the mapping. >>>>> >>>>>Are you claiming that a conscious machine stops being conscious if its >>>>>designers die >>>>>and all the information about how it works is lost? >>>> >>>>You are, if anyone is. I don't agree that computation *must* be >>>>interpreted, >>>>although they *can* be re-interpreted. >>> >>>What I claim is this: >>> >>>A computation does not *need* to be interpreted, it just is. However, a >>>computation >>>does need to be interpreted, or interact with its environment in some way, >>>if it is to be >>>interesting or meaningful. >> >>A computation other than the one you are running needs to be >>interpreted by you >>to be meaningful to you. The computation you are running is useful >>to you because it keeps you alive. >> >> >>>By analogy, a string of characters is a string of characters >>>whether or not anyone interprets it, but it is not interesting or meaningful >>>unless it is >>>interpreted. But if a computation, or for that matter a string of >>>characters, is conscious, >>>then it is interesting and meaningful in at least one sense in the absence >>>of an external >>>observer: it is interesting and meaningful to itself. If it were not, then >>>it wouldn't be >>>conscious. The conscious things in the world have an internal life, a first >>>person >>>phenomenal experience, a certain ineffable something, whatever you want to >>>call it, >>>while the unconscious things do not. That is the difference between them. >> >>Which they manage to be aware of without the existence of an external >>oberver, >>so one of your premises must be wrong. > > > No, that's exactly what I was saying all along. An observer is needed for > meaningfulness, > but consciousness provides its own observer. A conscious entity may interact > with its > environment, and in fact that would have to be the reason consciousness > evolved (nature > is not self-indulgent), but the interaction is not logically necessary for > consciousness.
But it may be nomologically necessary. "Not logically necessary" is the weakest standard of non-necessity that is still coherent; the only things less necessary are incoherent. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
