Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Bruno Marchal writes: > > >>Le 04-oct.-06, à 14:21, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : >> >> >>>Maudlin's example in his paper is rather complicated. If I could >>>summarise, he states that one >>>of the requirements for a conscious computation is that it not be the >>>trivial case of a recording, a >>>machine that plays out the same physical motion regardless of input. >>>He then proposes a second >>>machine next to one which on its own is just a recording, such that >>>the second machine comes into >>>play and acts on the first machine should inputs be different. The >>>system as a whole now handles >>>counterfactuals. However, should the counterfactuals not actually >>>arise, the second machine just >>>sits there inertly next to the first machine. We would now have to say >>>that when the first machine >>>goes through physical sequence abc on its own, it is just implementing >>>a recording and could not >>>possibly be conscious, while if it goes through the same sequence abc >>>with the second machine sitting >>>inertly next to it it is or could be conscious. This would seem to >>>contravene the supervenience thesis >>>which most computationalists accept: that mental activity supervenes >>>on physical activity, and further >>>that the same physical activity will give rise to the same mental >>>activity. For it seems in the example >>>that physical activity is the same in both cases (since the second >>>machine does nothing), yet in the >>>first case the system cannot be conscious while in the second case it >>>can. >> >> >>This is a nice summary of Maudlin's paper. >> >> >> >>>There are several possible responses to the above argument. One is >>>that computationalism is wrong. >>>Another is that the supervenience thesis is wrong and the mental does >>>not supervene on the physical >>>(but Bruno would say it supervenes on computation as Platonic object). >>>Yet another response is that >>>the idea that a recording cannot be conscious is wrong, and the >>>relationship between physical activity >>>and mental activity can be one->many, allowing that any physical >>>process may implement any >>>computation including any conscious computation. >> >>Why? The whole point is that consciousness or even just computation >>would supervene on *absence" of physical activity. >>This is not "on *any* physical activity. I can imagine the quantum >>vacuum is "full of computations", but saying consciousness supervene on >>no physical activity at all is equivalent, keeping the comp assumption, >>to associate consciousness on the immaterial/mathematical computations. >>This shows then why we have to explain the relative appearance of the >>"physical stuff". > > > It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on no > physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is also > consistent > to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, and > that > perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single quantum > state > there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant compared > to > the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to eliminate > it > completely. > > Stathis Papaioannou
But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. The quantum world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some probability. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
