Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>Brent Meeker writes:
>>>>>It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on 
>>>>>physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is 
>>>>>also consistent 
>>>>>to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, and 
>>>>>perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single quantum 
>>>>>there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant 
>>>>>compared to 
>>>>>the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to 
>>>>>eliminate it 
>>>>But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world.  
>>>>The quantum 
>>>>world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some 
>>>I assume you are referring to the MWI interpretation, in which the 
>>>counterfactuals are 
>>>always realised in some branch with certainty; in a classical world, the 
>>>are realised with some probability just as in the CI of QM. In any case, I 
>>>don't see that 
>>>it makes much difference to the argument. Consider this model of the MWI 
>>>case. A machine 
>>>is made up of two parts, a1 and b1, such that a1 is active at a particular 
>>>time and b1 
>>>comes into play from an inert state to alter the activity of a1 only if a 
>>>counterfactual is 
>>>realised. It seems absurd to say that a1 is conscious when it undergoes some 
>>>activity with b1 hovering over it inertly (because the counterfactual is not 
>>>realised) but not 
>>>conscious when it undergoes the same activity without b1 in place. But it 
>>>seems no less 
>>>absurd to me to say that a1 or a1b1 is conscious with an identical machine 
>>>next to it, a2b2, 
>>>in which the counterfactual is realised, but not if a2b2 is not present. For 
>>>how would a1/a1b1 
>>>know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of 
>>>the multiverse?
>>It's not a question of whether the "counterfactual" occurs.  If it occured it 
>>wouldn't be counterfactual.  The point is that in QM what occurs depends on 
>>could have occur but didn't; c.f. quant-ph/9610033, or seach for 
>>"interaction free measurment".
> Doesn't this refer to quantum interference effects? Otherwise what would be 
> the distinction between 
> a quantum computer and a classical computer in what we know is a quantum 
> world?
> Stathis Papaioannou

Yes, it does depend on quantum interference.  But a "classical computer" in 
quantum world can only be *approximately* classical.  So I'm wondering how that 
affects Maudlin's argument and others that depend on counterfactuals making no 

Brent Meeker

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at

Reply via email to