Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > >>Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >>>Brent Meeker writes: >>> >>> >>> >>>>>It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on >>>>>no >>>>>physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is >>>>>also consistent >>>>>to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, and >>>>>that >>>>>perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single quantum >>>>>state >>>>>there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant >>>>>compared to >>>>>the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to >>>>>eliminate it >>>>>completely. >>> >>> >>>>But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. >>>>The quantum >>>>world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some >>>>probability. >>> >>> >>>I assume you are referring to the MWI interpretation, in which the >>>counterfactuals are >>>always realised in some branch with certainty; in a classical world, the >>>counterfactuals >>>are realised with some probability just as in the CI of QM. In any case, I >>>don't see that >>>it makes much difference to the argument. Consider this model of the MWI >>>case. A machine >>>is made up of two parts, a1 and b1, such that a1 is active at a particular >>>time and b1 >>>comes into play from an inert state to alter the activity of a1 only if a >>>counterfactual is >>>realised. It seems absurd to say that a1 is conscious when it undergoes some >>>physical >>>activity with b1 hovering over it inertly (because the counterfactual is not >>>realised) but not >>>conscious when it undergoes the same activity without b1 in place. But it >>>seems no less >>>absurd to me to say that a1 or a1b1 is conscious with an identical machine >>>next to it, a2b2, >>>in which the counterfactual is realised, but not if a2b2 is not present. For >>>how would a1/a1b1 >>>know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of >>>the multiverse? >> >>It's not a question of whether the "counterfactual" occurs. If it occured it >>wouldn't be counterfactual. The point is that in QM what occurs depends on >>what >>could have occur but didn't; c.f. quant-ph/9610033, or seach arXiv.org for >>"interaction free measurment". > > > Doesn't this refer to quantum interference effects? Otherwise what would be > the distinction between > a quantum computer and a classical computer in what we know is a quantum > world? > > Stathis Papaioannou
Yes, it does depend on quantum interference. But a "classical computer" in this quantum world can only be *approximately* classical. So I'm wondering how that affects Maudlin's argument and others that depend on counterfactuals making no difference. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
