Brent Meeker writes: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Brent Meeker writes: > > > > > >>>It is consistent with Maudlin's paper to say consciousness supervenes on > >>>no > >>>physical activity - i.e. on computation as Platonic object - but it is > >>>also consistent > >>>to say that it supervenes on a recording, or on any physical activity, and > >>>that > >>>perhaps if there were no physical universe with at least a single quantum > >>>state > >>>there would be no consciousness. Admittedly the latter is inelegant > >>>compared to > >>>the "no physical supervenience" idea, but I can't quite see how to > >>>eliminate it > >>>completely. > > > > > >>But note that Maudlin's argument depends on being in a classical world. > >>The quantum > >>world in which we live the counterfactuals are always realized with some > >>probability. > > > > > > I assume you are referring to the MWI interpretation, in which the > > counterfactuals are > > always realised in some branch with certainty; in a classical world, the > > counterfactuals > > are realised with some probability just as in the CI of QM. In any case, I > > don't see that > > it makes much difference to the argument. Consider this model of the MWI > > case. A machine > > is made up of two parts, a1 and b1, such that a1 is active at a particular > > time and b1 > > comes into play from an inert state to alter the activity of a1 only if a > > counterfactual is > > realised. It seems absurd to say that a1 is conscious when it undergoes > > some physical > > activity with b1 hovering over it inertly (because the counterfactual is > > not realised) but not > > conscious when it undergoes the same activity without b1 in place. But it > > seems no less > > absurd to me to say that a1 or a1b1 is conscious with an identical machine > > next to it, a2b2, > > in which the counterfactual is realised, but not if a2b2 is not present. > > For how would a1/a1b1 > > know or care about a2b2, whether in the next room or in another branch of > > the multiverse? > > It's not a question of whether the "counterfactual" occurs. If it occured it > wouldn't be counterfactual. The point is that in QM what occurs depends on > what > could have occur but didn't; c.f. quant-ph/9610033, or seach arXiv.org for > "interaction free measurment".
Doesn't this refer to quantum interference effects? Otherwise what would be the distinction between a quantum computer and a classical computer in what we know is a quantum world? Stathis Papaioannou _________________________________________________________________ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
