On Oct 8, 6:29 pm, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be.

Well, if he is, so what? If we allow him this, what then follows -
isn't this more interesting?

He claims that computationalism is incompatible with
> materialism. That is not modest (or correct AFAICS)

I think the 'modesty' part is meant more to relate to provability
vs.believability, per Goedel/Lob - that we must live with doubt (i.e.
empiricism is ineliminable). As to computationalism, there seems to be
some confusion on the list (and elsewhere) between (at least) two
varieties. The first might I suppose be characterised as minimalist
comp, dealing with programs as instantiated in (as one might say) real
- i.e. material - computers. Clearly it would make no sense to say that
this kind of computationalism is incompatible with materialism - i.e
that physical processes can 'compute'.

So how does he get "computationalism is incompatible with
> materialism" out of such interviews?

>From the 8th step of the UDA argument. This attempts to show that if
one (but not you, I think?) starts with the much stronger assumption
that *consciousness supervenes on computation itself*, then it can't
also supervene on the physical. AFAICS, this stems fundamentally from
the inability to stabilise the instantiation of a computation, given
the lack of constraint on the material substrates that can be construed
as implementing equivalent computations. Given materialism, in other
words, 'computation' is just a metaphor - it's the physics that does
the work. I have to say that I think this may really point to a fatal
flaw in any assumption - within materialism - that consciousness can
supervene on the physical *per computation* in the standard AI sense.
However, consciousness may of course still be shown to supervene on
some physically stabilisable material process (e.g. at the neurological
or some other consistently materially-reducible level of explanation).

Bruon's empirical prediction require a UD to exist. That
> is an assumption beyond computationalism.

But not beyond 'comp', which is a horse of a different colour. The UDA
argument attempts to establish, and show the consequences of, a 'comp'
constrained to CT, AR, and the 'modest empiricism' of 'yes doctor'. It
*assumes* that putative stable conscious experiences are associated
with certain types of machine thus defined. From this stems the claim
that the consciousness of such machines can't simultaneously supervene
on an unstabilisable externally-defined 'material' substrate - in fact,
the 'material' also has to be an emergent from the computational in
this view. Comp and materialism start from radically different
assumptions, and have diametrically opposed explanatory directions.
However, I don't think they treat the *observables* in any essential
way as less 'real', but differ radically as to the source - and here
its does get difficult, because one can no longer simply appeal
directly to those observables - as Johnson failed to note in stubbing
his toe on the stone.

How can he come to conclusions about the uneality
> of matter without assuming the reality of something
> to take its place?

Well, in the end we can only believe that whatever it is must be 'real
in the sense that I am real', or where are we?

No, it's really easy. I am real, or I would not
> be writing this. What you mean is to
> establish it by abstract argumentation is difficult.
> Well, it is. That is why empiricists prefer empiricisim.

Well, as you know, I've also had some discomfort with aspects of
platonic or other possibly implicit assumptions in this approach, but I
think now that it's interesting and fruitful enough to suspend
judgement on this pending further (preferably empirically refutable)
results, without fully committing as a believer - but then that is not
what is demanded. However, I acknowledge the robustness of your
Johnsonian approach to refutation!

David

> David Nyman wrote:
> > On Oct 7, 1:16 pm, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense,
> > > don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any
> > > way.
>
> > Forgive me for butting in again, but is there not some way to stop this
> > particular disagreement from going round in circles interminably,
> > entertaining though it may be? For what it's worth, it seems to me that
> > Bruno has been saying that you get a number of interesting (and
> > unexpected) results when you start from a certain minimum set of
> > assumptions involving numbers and their relations.Yes. But he says he isn't 
> > assuming Platonism, although he must be.
>
> >  As he often
> > reiterates, this is a 'modest' view, making no claim to exclusive
> > explanatory truth,He claims that computationalism is incompatible with
> materialism. That is not modest (or correct AFAICS)
>
> > and - dealing as it does in 'machine psychology' -
> > limiting its claims to the consequences of 'interviewing' such machines
> > and discovering their povs.So how does he get "computationalism is 
> > incompatible with
> materialism" out of such interviews?
>
> > In achieving these results, AFAICS, no
> > claims need be made about the fundamental 'ontic realism' of numbers:
> > rather one is doing logic or mathematics from an axiomatic basis in the
> > normal way.How can he come to conclusions about the uneality
> of matter without assuming the reality of something
> to take its place?
>
> > The question of which set of 'ontic prejudices' we in fact employ as we
> > go about our daily affairs is of course another issue.And yet antoher issue 
> > is whether the conclusions of
> a valid arguiment must be contained in its premises.
>
> > It may of course
> > eventually turn out that theoretical or, preferably empirically
> > disconfirmable, results derived from comp become so compelling as to
> > force fundamental re-consideration of even such quotidian assumptions -
> > e.g. the notorious 'yes doctor' proposition.Bruon's empirical prediction 
> > require a UD to exist. That
> is an assumption beyond computationalism.
>
> > But as Bruno is again at
> > pains to point out, this won't be based on 'sure knowledge'. It will
> > always entail some 'act of faith'.
>
> > To establish what is in some ultimate sense 'real' - as opposed to
> > knowable or communicable - is extraordinarily difficult,No, it's really 
> > easy. I am real, or I would not
> be writing this. What you mean is to
> establish it by abstract argumentation is difficult.
> Well, it is. That is why empiricists prefer empiricisim.
>
> > and perhaps at
> > root incoherent. The debate, for example, over whether the
> > computational supervenes on the physical doesn't hinge on the 'ontic
> > reality' of the fundamental assumptions of physicalism or
> > computationalism. Rather, it's about resolving the explanatory
> > commensurability (or otherwise) of the sets of observables and
> > relations characteristic of these theoretical perspectives. Indeed what
> > else could it possibly be for humans (or machines) with only such data
> > at our disposal?
>
> > David
>
> > > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > > > There is no need to reify the numbers.[...]
>
> > > > I don't think so. Once you accept that the number theoretical truth is
> > > > independent of you (which I take as a form of humility), then it can be
> > > > explained quite precisely why "numbers" (in a third person view-view)
> > > > are bounded to believe in a physical (third person sharable) reality
> > > > and in a unnameable first person reality etc.Numbers that haven't been 
> > > > reified in any sense,
> > > don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any
> > > way.


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