David Nyman wrote: > On Oct 10, 2:51 am, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how > > computationalism is compatible with physicalism. You > > are complaining about circularity, not contradiction! > > So you're saying that this variety of computationalism merely claims > that whatever 'physical properties' happen to be picked out by the > 'right sort of computation' must be the ones that are responsible for > consciousness? But this is just dogma masquerading as explanation.
Saying "X-ists claim Y" is not dogma. Saying "Y, because i say so" is dogma. > > But remember > > that I have a narrowish view of what is a computer. And remember > > that consciousness is not held to be any old computation. > > Yes, but are you saying that *any old instantiation*, provided it > implements to your satisfaction the 'right sort of computation', must > by that token be conscious, whatever 'physical properties' it employs? I am saying that computationalists say that. > If you are, then AFAICS you're either claiming that *any old physical > properties* that implement the computation are fact doing the work of > creating consciousness, or that *none* are. Either option is > effectively abandoning materialism as the explanation for why the > computation is deemed to cause consciousness. It isn't abandoning "materialism" as the claim that matter exists. It *is* claiming that computation is a kind of shorthand for the sets of relevant physical properties. So what? Maybe all our current physics is an approximate, high-level rendition of something more fundamental. It's just a claim about what the right level of decription is. Most neuroscientists don't think you have t go down to the quantum level, even if they don't think the computational level is the right level of description. (It is also abandoning token-token identity theory. Are you getting that confused with materialism?) > If you aren't in fact > claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the > relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not > generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand for > decribing tightly constrained activities of just *those* physical > systems. I have no idea how you come to that conclusion. > In this case, you retain your appeal to materialism as > causally relevant, but mere 'computational equivalence', in the > implementation-independent mathematical sense, ceases to predict which > physical systems will be conscious, and which not. No it doesn't. Any system that implements computation C will be conscious, According To Computationalism. The other factors aren't relevant. ATC. > David --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---