David Nyman wrote:
> On Oct 10, 2:51 am, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how
> > computationalism is compatible with physicalism. You
> > are complaining about circularity, not contradiction!
> So you're saying that this variety of computationalism merely claims
> that whatever 'physical properties' happen to be picked out by the
> 'right sort of computation' must be the ones that are responsible for
> consciousness? But this is just dogma masquerading as explanation.
Saying "X-ists claim Y" is not dogma. Saying "Y, because i say so" is
> > But remember
> > that I have a narrowish view of what is a computer. And remember
> > that consciousness is not held to be any old computation.
> Yes, but are you saying that *any old instantiation*, provided it
> implements to your satisfaction the 'right sort of computation', must
> by that token be conscious, whatever 'physical properties' it employs?
I am saying that computationalists say that.
> If you are, then AFAICS you're either claiming that *any old physical
> properties* that implement the computation are fact doing the work of
> creating consciousness, or that *none* are. Either option is
> effectively abandoning materialism as the explanation for why the
> computation is deemed to cause consciousness.
It isn't abandoning "materialism" as the claim that matter exists.
It *is* claiming that computation is a kind of shorthand for the
sets of relevant physical properties. So what? Maybe
all our current physics is an approximate, high-level
rendition of something more fundamental. It's just a claim
about what the right level of decription is. Most neuroscientists
don't think you have t go down to the quantum level,
even if they don't think the computational level
is the right level of description.
(It is also abandoning token-token identity theory. Are
you getting that confused with materialism?)
> If you aren't in fact
> claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the
> relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not
> generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand for
> decribing tightly constrained activities of just *those* physical
I have no idea how you come to that conclusion.
> In this case, you retain your appeal to materialism as
> causally relevant, but mere 'computational equivalence', in the
> implementation-independent mathematical sense, ceases to predict which
> physical systems will be conscious, and which not.
No it doesn't. Any system that implements computation C will be
conscious, According To Computationalism. The other
factors aren't relevant. ATC.
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