David Nyman wrote: > On Oct 8, 6:29 pm, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be. > > Well, if he is, so what? If we allow him this, what then follows - > isn't this more interesting? > > He claims that computationalism is incompatible with > > materialism. That is not modest (or correct AFAICS) > > I think the 'modesty' part is meant more to relate to provability > vs.believability, per Goedel/Lob - that we must live with doubt (i.e. > empiricism is ineliminable). As to computationalism, there seems to be > some confusion on the list (and elsewhere) between (at least) two > varieties.
At least four! > The first might I suppose be characterised as minimalist > comp, dealing with programs as instantiated in (as one might say) real > - i.e. material - computers. Clearly it would make no sense to say that > this kind of computationalism is incompatible with materialism - i.e > that physical processes can 'compute'. > > So how does he get "computationalism is incompatible with > > materialism" out of such interviews? > > >From the 8th step of the UDA argument. This attempts to show that if > one (but not you, I think?) starts with the much stronger assumption > that *consciousness supervenes on computation itself*, What is a "computation itself"? A process? And algorithm? > then it can't > also supervene on the physical. Using supplementary assumptions -- such as "only activity counts". > AFAICS, this stems fundamentally from > the inability to stabilise the instantiation of a computation, given > the lack of constraint on the material substrates that can be construed > as implementing equivalent computations. Given materialism, in other > words, 'computation' is just a metaphor - it's the physics that does > the work. Yes, but it is still quite possible that a class of phsyical systems picked out by some computational(but ultimately physical) set of properties are conscious/cognitive in veirtue of those proeprties -- ie computationalism is a sort of convenient shorthand or shortcut to the physically relevant properties. > I have to say that I think this may really point to a fatal > flaw in any assumption - within materialism - that consciousness can > supervene on the physical *per computation* in the standard AI sense. > However, consciousness may of course still be shown to supervene on > some physically stabilisable material process (e.g. at the neurological > or some other consistently materially-reducible level of explanation). > > Bruon's empirical prediction require a UD to exist. That > > is an assumption beyond computationalism. > > But not beyond 'comp', which is a horse of a different colour. A Trojan horse with Plato in its belly... > The UDA > argument attempts to establish, and show the consequences of, a 'comp' > constrained to CT, AR, and the 'modest empiricism' of 'yes doctor'. It > *assumes* that putative stable conscious experiences are associated > with certain types of machine thus defined. From this stems the claim > that the consciousness of such machines can't simultaneously supervene > on an unstabilisable externally-defined 'material' substrate - in fact, > the 'material' also has to be an emergent from the computational in > this view. You are presenting the conclusions, not the argument. > Comp and materialism start from radically different > assumptions, and have diametrically opposed explanatory directions. The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism is a bold and startling claim. If comp is not "standard" computationalism, the fact that it is incompatible with materalism may be a lot less impactive. comp might simply beg the question. > However, I don't think they treat the *observables* in any essential > way as less 'real', but differ radically as to the source - and here > its does get difficult, because one can no longer simply appeal > directly to those observables - as Johnson failed to note in stubbing > his toe on the stone. The Johnsonian argument can be used as a wayof establishing the meaning of "exist". It answers the question "what definition of existence is there other than the mathematical one". > How can he come to conclusions about the uneality > > of matter without assuming the reality of something > > to take its place? > > Well, in the end we can only believe that whatever it is must be 'real > in the sense that I am real', or where are we? The point is that computationalists can continue to believe in matter so long as they don't believe in numbers. > No, it's really easy. I am real, or I would not > > be writing this. What you mean is to > > establish it by abstract argumentation is difficult. > > Well, it is. That is why empiricists prefer empiricisim. > > Well, as you know, I've also had some discomfort with aspects of > platonic or other possibly implicit assumptions in this approach, but I > think now that it's interesting and fruitful enough to suspend > judgement on this pending further (preferably empirically refutable) > results, without fully committing as a believer - but then that is not > what is demanded. However, I acknowledge the robustness of your > Johnsonian approach to refutation! > David > > > David Nyman wrote: > > > On Oct 7, 1:16 pm, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense, > > > > don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any > > > > way. > > > > > Forgive me for butting in again, but is there not some way to stop this > > > particular disagreement from going round in circles interminably, > > > entertaining though it may be? For what it's worth, it seems to me that > > > Bruno has been saying that you get a number of interesting (and > > > unexpected) results when you start from a certain minimum set of > > > assumptions involving numbers and their relations.Yes. But he says he > > > isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be. > > > > > As he often > > > reiterates, this is a 'modest' view, making no claim to exclusive > > > explanatory truth,He claims that computationalism is incompatible with > > materialism. That is not modest (or correct AFAICS) > > > > > and - dealing as it does in 'machine psychology' - > > > limiting its claims to the consequences of 'interviewing' such machines > > > and discovering their povs.So how does he get "computationalism is > > > incompatible with > > materialism" out of such interviews? > > > > > In achieving these results, AFAICS, no > > > claims need be made about the fundamental 'ontic realism' of numbers: > > > rather one is doing logic or mathematics from an axiomatic basis in the > > > normal way.How can he come to conclusions about the uneality > > of matter without assuming the reality of something > > to take its place? > > > > > The question of which set of 'ontic prejudices' we in fact employ as we > > > go about our daily affairs is of course another issue.And yet antoher > > > issue is whether the conclusions of > > a valid arguiment must be contained in its premises. > > > > > It may of course > > > eventually turn out that theoretical or, preferably empirically > > > disconfirmable, results derived from comp become so compelling as to > > > force fundamental re-consideration of even such quotidian assumptions - > > > e.g. the notorious 'yes doctor' proposition.Bruon's empirical prediction > > > require a UD to exist. That > > is an assumption beyond computationalism. > > > > > But as Bruno is again at > > > pains to point out, this won't be based on 'sure knowledge'. It will > > > always entail some 'act of faith'. > > > > > To establish what is in some ultimate sense 'real' - as opposed to > > > knowable or communicable - is extraordinarily difficult,No, it's really > > > easy. I am real, or I would not > > be writing this. What you mean is to > > establish it by abstract argumentation is difficult. > > Well, it is. That is why empiricists prefer empiricisim. > > > > > and perhaps at > > > root incoherent. The debate, for example, over whether the > > > computational supervenes on the physical doesn't hinge on the 'ontic > > > reality' of the fundamental assumptions of physicalism or > > > computationalism. Rather, it's about resolving the explanatory > > > commensurability (or otherwise) of the sets of observables and > > > relations characteristic of these theoretical perspectives. Indeed what > > > else could it possibly be for humans (or machines) with only such data > > > at our disposal? > > > > > David > > > > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > > There is no need to reify the numbers.[...] > > > > > > > I don't think so. Once you accept that the number theoretical truth is > > > > > independent of you (which I take as a form of humility), then it can > > > > > be > > > > > explained quite precisely why "numbers" (in a third person view-view) > > > > > are bounded to believe in a physical (third person sharable) reality > > > > > and in a unnameable first person reality etc.Numbers that haven't > > > > > been reified in any sense, > > > > don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any > > > > way. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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