Le 08-oct.-06, à 08:00, George Levy a écrit :
> > Bruno, > > Finally I read your filmed graph argument which I have stored in my > computer. (The original at the Iridia web site > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume3CC/3%20%202%20.pdf > is not accessible anymore. I am not sure why.) Thanks for telling. I know people a reconfiguring the main server at IRIDIA, I hope it is only that. > > In page TROIS -61 you describe an experience of consciousness which is > comprised partially of a later physical process and partially of the > recording of an earlier physical process. > > It is possible to resolve the paradox simply by saying that > consciousness involves two partial processes each occupying two > different time intervals, the time intervals being connected by a > recording, such that the earlier partial process is combined with the > later partial process, the recording acting as a connection device. I mainly agree. But assuming comp it seems to me this is just a question of "acceptable" implementation of consciousness. Once implemented in any "correct" ways, the reasoning shows, or is supposed to show, that the inner first person experience cannot be attributed to the physical activity. The "physical" keep an important role by giving the frame of the possible relative manifestations of the consciousness. But already at this stage, consciousness can no more been attached to it. On the contrary, keeping the comp hyp, the physical must emerge from the coherence of "enough" possible relative manifestations. > > I am not saying that consciousness supervene on the physical substrate. > All I am saying is that the example does not prove that consciousness > does not supervene the physical. The example is just an instance of > consciousness operating across two different time intervals by mean of > a > physical substrate and a physical means (recording) of connecting these > two time intervals. In this case, would you take this as an argument for the necessity of the physical, you would change the notion of physical supervenience a lot. You would be attaching consciousness to some history of physical activity. But if you keep comp, you will not been able to use genuinely that past physical activity. If you could, it would be like asking to the doctor an artificial brain with the guarantee that the hardware of that brain has been gone through some genuine physical stories, although no memory of those stories are needed in the computation made by the new (artificial) brain; or if such memory *are* needed, it would mean the doctor has not made the right level choice. Now, when you say the reasoning does not *prove* that consciousness does not supervene the physical, you are correct. But sup-phys says there is no consciousness without the physical, i.e. some physical primary ontology is needed for consciusness, and that is what the reasoning is supposed to be showing absurd: not only we don't need the physical (like thermodynamicians do not need "invisible horses pulling cars"), but MOVIE-GRAPH + UDA (*) makes obligatory the appearance of the physical emerging from *all* (relative) computations, making twice the concept of primitive matter useless. OK? ...I realize I could be clearer(**) (*) Caution: in "Conscience et Mecanisme" the movie-graph argument precedes the UD argument (the seven first step of the 8-steps-version of the current UDA). In my Lille thesis, the movie graph follows the UD argument for eliminating the use of the "existence of a universe hypothesis"; so there are some nuances between the different versions. (**) I am open to thoroughly discuss this, for example in november. Right now I am a bit over-busy (until the end of october). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
