David Nyman wrote: > But this conclusion > is, I think, why Bruno thinks that 'matter' has no real explanatory > role in the account of conscious experience. This isn't quite > equivalent to claiming that it can't be the primary reality, but rather > to claim that it adds nothing to the accounts of computationalism or > consciousness to do so, beyond the role of 'relational placeholder'. > > David
That's a redundancy argument, not an incompatibility argument. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
