Le 11-oct.-06, à 02:26, 1Z a écrit :
> David Nyman wrote: >> But this conclusion >> is, I think, why Bruno thinks that 'matter' has no real explanatory >> role in the account of conscious experience. This isn't quite >> equivalent to claiming that it can't be the primary reality, but >> rather >> to claim that it adds nothing to the accounts of computationalism or >> consciousness to do so, beyond the role of 'relational placeholder'. >> >> David Yes. > > That's a redundancy argument, not an incompatibility argument. Yes. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
