Le 11-oct.-06, à 02:26, 1Z a écrit :

> David Nyman wrote:
>> But this conclusion
>> is, I think, why Bruno thinks that 'matter' has no real explanatory
>> role in the account of conscious experience. This isn't quite
>> equivalent to claiming that it can't be the primary reality, but 
>> rather
>> to claim that it adds nothing to the accounts of computationalism or
>> consciousness to do so, beyond the role of 'relational placeholder'.
>> David


> That's a redundancy argument, not an incompatibility argument.




You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to