On Oct 10, 8:31 pm, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> > In this case, I would have to agree with Bruno
> > that 'matter' is simply being deployed as a placeholder for relata,That's a 
> > feature, not a bug.
>
> > and
> > has no further explanatory role (except existence, of course - your
> > sticking point, I think).

> That would be a redundancy argument,. not an incompatibility
> (contradiction) argument.

OK - in the interests of getting somewhere, can we settle for that?
i.e. The 'properties' we have been debating are purely relational
(whatever that turns out to entail)?

David


> David Nyman wrote:
> > On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > > >  If you aren't in fact
> > > > claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the
> > > > relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not
> > > > generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand for
> > > > decribing tightly constrained activities of just *those* physical
> > > > systems.
>
> > > I have no idea how you come to that conclusion.
>
> > I don't see how you can *avoid* this conclusion, unless you've landed
> > on some unexcluded middle position that I fail to grasp. If
> > computationalists claim the same set of properties as are picked out by
> > *any* instantiation of a computation are also responsible for a stable
> > state of consciousness, then they simply aren't being serious about the
> > 'physical' aspect of these 'properties'. Any relationship whatever
> > between the properties that support computation, and those putatively
> > reponsible for any 1-person state of the machine,The claim of 
> > computationalism is that the relationship
> between the properties that support (a particular kind of)
> computation , and those putatively reponsible for any 1-person state of
> the machine,
> are identical. ie, physical systems are conscious because of their
> cpmputional properties, and only
> indirectly because of the physical properties that support he
> computation.
>
> > is *irrelevant* to
> > the causal explanation of the computation (i.e. such a state could vary
> > wildly with the instantiation, but this would have no effect whatsover
> > on the computation *qua computation*).Some causation is required for 
> > computation, and *some*
> properties are required for causation. So far, everything
> is compatible with materialism (ie the claim that "material things are
> the only things").
>
> > However, it's precisely what
> > *must* be relevant if the internal state is to be determined by those
> > selfsame properties.If the computation that produces consciousness is 
> > "computation C",
> then "computation C" will not be produced by any set of properties,
> so in that sense the properties are relevant. Is that the problem?
>
> Or do you think that different sets of properties must
> produce different conscious states? That is not
> an implication of the supervenience of consciousness on
> the physical. Supervenience only requires that
> the same mental state is always
> associated with the same physical one.
> Of course the same physical state will
> produce the same computational state...
>
> >  To claim that the *same* 1-person state is
> > generated by wildly variable sets of properties, is precisely to say
> > that such 'properties' - i.e. whatever material aspects they are
> > supposed to pick out - are in effect *irrelevant* to the state.What is 
> > relevant is relations between the properties, ATC.
>
> That is the properties are neither irrelevant
> nor relevant in the way suggested by token-token identity (which is
> what you seem to be assuming).
>
> >  This
> > appears to be flatly contradictory, unless in effect the 'properties'
> > so picked out are not in any meaningful sense 'physical' - i.e. they
> > are purely relational.I am not clear why you would call that meaningless.
> That is still miles form Bruno-style non-physicalism,
> in which neither matter nor space nor time
> nor any physical property at all is needed.
>
> But I am not arguing that computationalism
> is compatible with physicalism I am arguing that computationalism
> is compatible with materialsim -- "matter exists".
>
> > In this case, I would have to agree with Bruno
> > that 'matter' is simply being deployed as a placeholder for relata,That's a 
> > feature, not a bug.
>
> > and
> > has no further explanatory role (except existence, of course - your
> > sticking point, I think).That would be a redundancy argument,. not an 
> > incompatibility
> (contradiction) argument.


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