On Oct 10, 9:12 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Then
> a calculation of pi is picked out among all instantiations of all 
> computations - but
> it is still possible to calculate pi many different ways on many different 
> physical
> systems.  And it is possible by inspection of these systems to determine 
> whether they
> calculate pi.

But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are
conscious. 'Calculating pi' in the final analysis can be satisfied by
the system in question externalising its results (e.g. printing out the
value of pi). But it isn't so simple to test a system that is claimed
to be conscious. Be that as it may, would you be content with the
conclusion that the 'properties' of materialism claimed to be jointly
relevant to both computationalism and consciousness are purely
relational? In this case, we needn't argue further. But this conclusion
is, I think, why Bruno thinks that 'matter' has no real explanatory
role in the account of conscious experience. This isn't quite
equivalent to claiming that it can't be the primary reality, but rather
to claim that it adds nothing to the accounts of computationalism or
consciousness to do so, beyond the role of 'relational placeholder'.

David

> David Nyman wrote:
>
> > On Oct 10, 2:51 am, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> >> It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how 
> >> computationalism is
> >> compatible with physicalism. You are complaining about circularity, not
> >> contradiction!
>
> > So you're saying that this variety of computationalism merely claims that 
> > whatever
> > 'physical properties' happen to be picked out by the 'right sort of 
> > computation'
> > must be the ones that are responsible for consciousness? But this is just 
> > dogma
> > masquerading as explanation.It's not dogma if it's just offered as a 
> > possibility; a possibility that refutes the
> claim that computationalism is incompatible with materialism.
>
>
>
>
>
> >> But remember that I have a narrowish view of what is a computer. And 
> >> remember
> >> that consciousness is not held to be any old computation.
>
> > Yes, but are you saying that *any old instantiation*, provided it 
> > implements to
> > your satisfaction the 'right sort of computation', must by that token be
> > conscious, whatever 'physical properties' it employs? If you are, then 
> > AFAICS
> > you're either claiming that *any old physical properties* that implement the
> > computation are fact doing the work of creating consciousness, or that 
> > *none* are.
> > Either option is effectively abandoning materialism as the explanation for 
> > why the
> >  computation is deemed to cause consciousness. If you aren't in fact 
> > claiming
> > this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the relevant 
> > properties can
> > be valid only in the context of *specific*, not generalised, 
> > instantiations, and
> > thus becomes merely a shorthand for decribing tightly constrained 
> > activities of
> > just *those* physical systems. In this case, you retain your appeal to 
> > materialism
> > as causally relevant, but mere 'computational equivalence', in the
> > implementation-independent mathematical sense, ceases to predict which 
> > physical
> > systems will be conscious, and which not.Just replace "be conscious" and 
> > "consciousness" with "be a calculation of pi".  Then
> a calculation of pi is picked out among all instantiations of all 
> computations - but
> it is still possible to calculate pi many different ways on many different 
> physical
> systems.  And it is possible by inspection of these systems to determine 
> whether they
> calculate pi.
> 
> Brent Meeker


--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Reply via email to