<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

>> a) assume that there is an 'objective reality in the Bruno sense: a
reality exists. _any_ sort of reality will do.
>> b) draw a purely notional boundary around any portion of it at any
spatiotemporal scale.
> Do you think it's possible *not* to start with this assumption?

No. As a scientifically hypotheses you have a bunch of options, but for
this particular one:

H1: "There is a real world and our perceptions permit a level of
apprehension of it"

....you'd have to say that the existence and ongoing success of science
makes it perhaps one of the most empirically supported scientific theorems
of all time. Every experiment ever done is an emplicit experiment on this
hypothsesis. A philosophical argument questioning the existence of reality
would have to be an untestable/sophist waste of good words, no?

> The
> problem with natural language is that it implicitly assumes the AIV is
'out there' as the primary reality, and it can be tough to work
> back from this point of departure. I was trying to develop a language
that started from the APV and worked outwards, as it were, so that it was
easier to see how emergent information boundaries were shaping and
structuring the APV and the AIV while at the same time contingently
creating the 'not-X', without fundamentally creating novel ontic (as
opposed to epistemic) categories.

I'm not sure you need be so shy about creating the novel ontic categories
- after all, the set we have is entirely an organisation of appearances,
not the actual reality underneath. If there is ontic validity to be had,
the as yet unassailed ontology of the underlying reality is the only 'real
one'. However, the two are not in any real conflict - they are separate

> Somehow it's like:
> a) we mentally step outside of the APV to see what it's like in the
'external world'
> b) we make models of what we see out there (the AIV), including our
> c) then we forget about step a), get stranded outside, and take the AIV
for 'reality'
> d) leaving us in a panic about how to get back inside our 'brains'

This is an assumption of truth of the following hypothesis:
H2: "There is a real world an we literally access it"

This, I think, conflicts with modern neuroscience and is therefore
refuted. It makes use of an assumption about perception that is not
proven. However, getting mainstream empirisism and consciousness studies
to realise it is another matter!

> Somebody once asked "what is the external world 'external' to?"
> Do you know?

Damned good question! It seems that anything perceptually regarded as 'not
me' would do. I've found the terms by Derek Denton useful:

'INTEROCEPTION' as those phenomenal percepts constructed of qualia
intentionality(aboutness) directed at physical self (situational emotions,
primordial emotions).  I would extend the definition to include internal
imagery of all kinds as a more complex form.

'EXTEROCEPTION' as those phenomenal percepts constructed of qualia
representing (intentional content/aboutness in respect of) the external
world or our physical interface with it (touch, taste, vsision, aural

So I guess the external world is "that part of reality depicted by and
therefore apprehended through exteroception" would be as good a starting
definition as any. It depends on whether the notion of 'self' includes
physical self (I think it does).

>> some people here think the APV is '3-person'
>> some people here think the AIV is '3-person'
> My view is that the *fact of * the APV is 1-person, and everything else
is 3-person. That is, the 1-person is the unmediated intuitive grasp of
3-person information by the 'underlying reality'. What lies within the
APV, the AIV, or the 'external world' to which they refer, then depends
solely on contingent boundaries emerging from 3-person
> information gradients and horizons.  Essentially this is categorising
the ontology as 1-person, and the epistemology as 3-person. However, I
realise that this is a minority approach, and has caused much
> confusion, so I've more or less given up trying to promote it.

How can this approach possibly be optional!

> I think the general view is that the APV is 1-person, and the AIV is
3-person. But then, the AIV *model* of the APV is 3-person, and the
distinction between this and the 1-person APV is confusing (the 'hard

The mere idea of self referential model (the AIV *model* of the APV) is,
IMO, an oxymoron at the heart of the (hard) problem. This is a cultural
assumption several hundred years old - it's use-by date is soooooo
expired. How do you get the message out?

>> The easiest way to think of it is to regard X as a finger puppet. The
'fingers' are behaving atomly in that the fingers are painted (appear -
APV) to deliver the appearance of 'atom-ly (AIV) behaviour'. The AIV says
>> nothing about FINGERS. Then note that whatever the fingers are - you,
>> observer - are made of the SAME FINGERS and those fingers are painting
>> APV in your head. The reason no-one ever gets a physics of qualia is
>> nobody EVER gets scientific about _fingers_ - the underling physics -
Everyone thinks the AIV generalisations ARE the fingers.
> Conventional physics, I think, denies that the fingers exist - all that
can be said is what QM / string theory / model of the month describes, and
this is equivalent to saying that that's all there is folks. Comp,
however, would say that the fingers are something like mathematical ontic
/ epistemic categories (see some of Marc Geddes' posts), and that these
support the emergence of 3-person relata. Sets of these 1-person /
3-person relationships can be nested recursively, the whole resting on the
'turtle' of a tightly constrained
> 'number reality' (e.g. AR+CT+UDA). The 'modest' assumption here
> is that not to force 'faith' in comp, but rather study and test it for
its interesting and surprising results and generative power. The most
powerful result would be to pin down the 'emergence direction' of
1-person <--> 3-person once and for all.

Yes. This denial really freaks me out. It makes cosmology a religion. As a
scientist I cannot tolerate it.

I have a calculus (a heuristic for one, really) called 'entropy calculus',
EC, which I think (not sure yet but confidence rising) might be able to be
thought of an actual instance of COMP based on the real occurrence (rough
coincidence) of an extravagently huge number of identical primitives
(which operate as axioms). Each axiom can be viewed as a 'mathematician'.
The calculus is massively parallel mathematics (not singular/serial, as
driven by a lone classical mathematician pushing a proof along). The
current state of the cooperative efforts of all the mathematicians
....whose relationships are iterative rules of
inference/transformation.... literally is reality. There is one massive
rolling 'proof' unfolding without end.

My maths skills are not strong enough to deal with all the nuances of
Bruno's ideas, but I have picked up on key relata. The main point: There
is no abstraction/modelling going on. This is not a computation but a
COMPutation. At least I think it can be viewed this way. What Bruno's work
does is to explore the general features of it. The only problem I have
with it is if you say that COMP can happen as a result of
constructing a computational 'as-if' substrate made of our reality - then
every practically useful thing about COMP dissappears (there is no 'actual
being' in the analyses of COMP, only notional indicators of those aspect
that might correspond to 'being').

So on that proviso - that reality is a literal instantation of _a_ COMP

If reality = state of the proof, then
(a) physical stuff = a proof in EC = matter. These are proven truths in EC.
(b) the unproven truths in EC are, in effect, 'virtual matter'

The pactical view:
2 mathematicians A, B working together(coherent) prove 3 theorems.
(i) A (matter)
(ii) B (matter)
(iii) A with respect to B (virtual matter)

neither mathematician A nor B physically 'proves' (iii), it is implicit in
the act of (i) and (ii) that their relationship (iii) is just as well
defined as (i) and (ii). It's just that no mathematician actually does the
proof. It's inherent in the parallelism of the situation.
The relationship ME_AS_MATTER (proof) and NOT-ME (all the rest of matter
as other proofs) is a massive collection of unproven truths in EC. This is
the 'latent perspective view' of NOT_ME from ME that I speak of. This is
NOT 1-person as discussed above, but latent 1-person, actually used by the
brain to construct 1-person. Parallelism is intrinsic to the situation -
so if a COMP implementation enforces any loss of parallelism COMP will
never be able to claim that the resulting system has any consciousness.
That's I think is the essence of the only problem I have with COMP.

In other words:

REALITY is a COMPUTATION on a natural axiom set?  YES.
COMPUTATION manfactured of an existing reality constructs a REALITY?  NO.


Ql. What if mathematician A, modifies (i) to 'act as-if' (ii) existed?
Voila QUALIA can be piggybacked off the 'latent view' = virtual matter = 
virtual proof (iii). Takes a while to get used to this.

Q2. Does this not mean that "associative memory" is literally "inductive
inference" that creates a 'truth' in EC that could be regarded 'a useful
but unproven lie' about reality = empirical knowledge implemented in EC?

There you have an ontolgy and a derivative empistemology implemented in EC.

Also.. re 'turtles'
The turtles in EC are merely fluctuations. They are what would could be
called 'loops' in QM. Recursivity = nested loops. Anything with a result =
1 loop can combine with any other loop...thus with loops you can make
everything (including strings). The ultimate 'biggee' fluctuation = the
whole universe. Everything is the same at all scales.


Maybe bruno can calibrate the terms in COMP jargon so we're all on the
same page. The EC, as an actual instance (or a class of instances) of
COMP, should be able to be expressed in COMP terms, but I don't know how.
I'd like to write it all up - as it is predictive of the behaviour of
brain material in the way that Bruno wants COMP to be empirically
testable. At least that's what I am beginning to think, having beaten my
head over his maths for a while (my brain hurts).

so when you say:
"> is that not to force 'faith' in comp, but rather study and test it for
its interesting and surprising results and generative power. The most
powerful result would be to pin down the 'emergence direction' of
1-person <--> 3-person once and for all."

This is how I would look at it: I got to EC just via Godel/Church/Turing
and thinking in real terms. Bruno has, I think, generalised the whole
process but not fully grasped the reification of it ...or more likely :-)
.... I have not fully grasped his notions of reification. Calulus based on
non-numerics must seem weird to a mathematician, but there are no
'numbers' in our EC reality, only fluctuations in aggregate that have
properties 'sufficiently like' numbers to create the local calculii we
identify as 'empiirical laws of nature'.

If you could help me relate EC to COMP it'd be a big help. I think there
might be a TOE in here someplace via a reified COMP instantated as EC that
is empirically supported but ONLY testable in brain material. Just an

How'd we get here from the original thread question? Whew! I blame that
person! :-)

colin hales

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