Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: [COLIN] > I'm not sure you need be so shy about creating the novel ontic categories > - after all, the set we have is entirely an organisation of appearances, > not the actual reality underneath. If there is ontic validity to be had, > the as yet unassailed ontology of the underlying reality is the only 'real > one'. However, the two are not in any real conflict - they are separate > ontologies.

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[DAVID] I was actually thinking in terms of emphasising the *single* seamless ontic status of 'out there' and 'in here' - i.e. the contingency of 'boundaries'. The 'novelty' would be introducing a second primary ontic status (this is IMO the point where the hard problem appears). But you see what I mean about language? This is why I don't insist on using my own terminology in this area, although it's still the way I think about it privately. > > My view is that the *fact of * the APV is 1-person, and everything else > is 3-person. That is, the 1-person is the unmediated intuitive grasp of > 3-person information by the 'underlying reality'. What lies within the > APV, the AIV, or the 'external world' to which they refer, then depends > solely on contingent boundaries emerging from 3-person > > information gradients and horizons. Essentially this is categorising > the ontology as 1-person, and the epistemology as 3-person. However, I > realise that this is a minority approach, and has caused much > > confusion, so I've more or less given up trying to promote it. > > [COLIN] > How can this approach possibly be optional! [DAVID] As, I've said, it's the specific language (perhaps) that's optional, not IMO the analysis, or the intuition that lies behind it. [COLIN] > RE: COMP > I have a calculus (a heuristic for one, really) called 'entropy calculus', > EC, which I think (not sure yet but confidence rising) might be able to be > thought of an actual instance of COMP based on the real occurrence (rough > coincidence) of an extravagently huge number of identical primitives > (which operate as axioms). Each axiom can be viewed as a 'mathematician'. > The calculus is massively parallel mathematics (not singular/serial, as > driven by a lone classical mathematician pushing a proof along). The > current state of the cooperative efforts of all the mathematicians > ....whose relationships are iterative rules of > inference/transformation.... literally is reality. There is one massive > rolling 'proof' unfolding without end. [DAVID] Perhaps this could connect productively (metaphorically at least) with cellular automata theory (cf. Wolfram et. al.)? There is some convergence in the notions of primitive 'axioms' and massive parallelism - and I suppose that if the operational space was sufficiently 'extravagantly huge' (limit case: infinite), you might argue for the recursive emergence of number, arithmetic, and the rest. I guess there would be no discrete UD, its role (i.e. the stepwise execution of all 'code' in rotation) being distributed over some massively parallel assemblage of 'theorem provers'. How, or whether, one could get comp to run on this 'machine', I am unsure. I'd be interested in your view of what the minimum axiomatic constraints of such an approach might be, such as instantiations of 0-bit and 1-bit, plus some minimal set of state-based rules. This seems a fruitful theoretical area, but one in which I possess no expertise. [COLIN] > In other words: > > REALITY is a COMPUTATION on a natural axiom set? YES. > COMPUTATION manfactured of an existing reality constructs a REALITY? NO. [DAVID] This is a really confusing (to me) aspect of comp v. 'standard computationalism' (and too often no clear distinction is made). Bruno argues (8th step of the UDA) - and I follow him in this - that for consciousness to supervene on computationalism, 'matter' can serve no explanatory role other than that of a placeholder for the 'relata'. Hence, under comp, 'matter' emerges from 'number', not vice versa. The 'yes doctor' argument appears to appeal to the possibility of 'actual material hardware' being utilised to instantiate consciousness computationally. But there is still the crucial issue of 'substitution level' - instantiation must occur at the right layer of the hierarchy of nesting / recursion, so I suppose that in terms of this hierarchy, all notions of 'hardware' are themselves relational emergents. No final theory of this appears to exist at present - at the last resort you are left to choose in 'good faith'. So whether it constitutes an 'existing reality' in your terms is moot. [COLIN] > If you could help me relate EC to COMP it'd be a big help. I think there > might be a TOE in here someplace via a reified COMP instantated as EC that > is empirically supported but ONLY testable in brain material. Just an > idea. [DAVID] Hmm..a simple task, perhaps, but where to begin...?? I'm not sure Bruno would be very happy at the notion of 'reifying' comp, but I don't want to fall into the quagmire of the interminable struggle between him and Peter on this one. Maybe you could show how COMP could emerge from a more primitive EC, possibly along similar lines to those I mention above. At the end of the day, we can only work with relata and rules, so whether this is physics, mathematics or logic is possibly a question of taste, as long as one doesn't get hung up on academic definitions of 'existence'. For me, what we mustn't shrink from ascribing to what we describe is Peter's 'reality in the sense that I am real'. So it must account for the qualitative emergence of both 1- and 3-person povs, and be clear on the hierarchies (or entelechies) entailed in this. David > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > In-Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > [Colin]> > >> a) assume that there is an 'objective reality in the Bruno sense: a > reality exists. _any_ sort of reality will do. > >> b) draw a purely notional boundary around any portion of it at any > spatiotemporal scale. > > > [DAVID] > > Do you think it's possible *not* to start with this assumption? > > [COLIN] > No. As a scientifically hypotheses you have a bunch of options, but for > this particular one: > > H1: "There is a real world and our perceptions permit a level of > apprehension of it" > > ....you'd have to say that the existence and ongoing success of science > makes it perhaps one of the most empirically supported scientific theorems > of all time. Every experiment ever done is an emplicit experiment on this > hypothsesis. A philosophical argument questioning the existence of reality > would have to be an untestable/sophist waste of good words, no? > > [DAVID] > > The > > problem with natural language is that it implicitly assumes the AIV is > 'out there' as the primary reality, and it can be tough to work > > back from this point of departure. I was trying to develop a language > that started from the APV and worked outwards, as it were, so that it was > easier to see how emergent information boundaries were shaping and > structuring the APV and the AIV while at the same time contingently > creating the 'not-X', without fundamentally creating novel ontic (as > opposed to epistemic) categories. > > [COLIN] > I'm not sure you need be so shy about creating the novel ontic categories > - after all, the set we have is entirely an organisation of appearances, > not the actual reality underneath. If there is ontic validity to be had, > the as yet unassailed ontology of the underlying reality is the only 'real > one'. However, the two are not in any real conflict - they are separate > ontologies. > > [DAVID] > > Somehow it's like: > > > > a) we mentally step outside of the APV to see what it's like in the > 'external world' > > b) we make models of what we see out there (the AIV), including our > 'brains' > > c) then we forget about step a), get stranded outside, and take the AIV > for 'reality' > > d) leaving us in a panic about how to get back inside our 'brains' > > [COLIN] > This is an assumption of truth of the following hypothesis: > H2: "There is a real world an we literally access it" > > This, I think, conflicts with modern neuroscience and is therefore > refuted. It makes use of an assumption about perception that is not > proven. However, getting mainstream empirisism and consciousness studies > to realise it is another matter! > > [DAVID] > > Somebody once asked "what is the external world 'external' to?" > > Do you know? > > Damned good question! It seems that anything perceptually regarded as 'not > me' would do. I've found the terms by Derek Denton useful: > > 'INTEROCEPTION' as those phenomenal percepts constructed of qualia > intentionality(aboutness) directed at physical self (situational emotions, > primordial emotions). I would extend the definition to include internal > imagery of all kinds as a more complex form. > > 'EXTEROCEPTION' as those phenomenal percepts constructed of qualia > representing (intentional content/aboutness in respect of) the external > world or our physical interface with it (touch, taste, vsision, aural > etc). > > So I guess the external world is "that part of reality depicted by and > therefore apprehended through exteroception" would be as good a starting > definition as any. It depends on whether the notion of 'self' includes > physical self (I think it does). > > [COLIN] > >> some people here think the APV is '3-person' > >> some people here think the AIV is '3-person' > > > [DAVID] > > My view is that the *fact of * the APV is 1-person, and everything else > is 3-person. That is, the 1-person is the unmediated intuitive grasp of > 3-person information by the 'underlying reality'. What lies within the > APV, the AIV, or the 'external world' to which they refer, then depends > solely on contingent boundaries emerging from 3-person > > information gradients and horizons. Essentially this is categorising > the ontology as 1-person, and the epistemology as 3-person. However, I > realise that this is a minority approach, and has caused much > > confusion, so I've more or less given up trying to promote it. > > [COLIN] > How can this approach possibly be optional! > > [DAVID] > > I think the general view is that the APV is 1-person, and the AIV is > 3-person. But then, the AIV *model* of the APV is 3-person, and the > distinction between this and the 1-person APV is confusing (the 'hard > problem'). > > [COLIN] > The mere idea of self referential model (the AIV *model* of the APV) is, > IMO, an oxymoron at the heart of the (hard) problem. This is a cultural > assumption several hundred years old - it's use-by date is soooooo > expired. How do you get the message out? > > > [COLIN] > >> The easiest way to think of it is to regard X as a finger puppet. The > 'fingers' are behaving atomly in that the fingers are painted (appear - > APV) to deliver the appearance of 'atom-ly (AIV) behaviour'. The AIV says > >> nothing about FINGERS. Then note that whatever the fingers are - you, > the > >> observer - are made of the SAME FINGERS and those fingers are painting > the > >> APV in your head. The reason no-one ever gets a physics of qualia is > that > >> nobody EVER gets scientific about _fingers_ - the underling physics - > Everyone thinks the AIV generalisations ARE the fingers. > > > [DAVID] > > Conventional physics, I think, denies that the fingers exist - all that > can be said is what QM / string theory / model of the month describes, and > this is equivalent to saying that that's all there is folks. Comp, > however, would say that the fingers are something like mathematical ontic > / epistemic categories (see some of Marc Geddes' posts), and that these > support the emergence of 3-person relata. Sets of these 1-person / > 3-person relationships can be nested recursively, the whole resting on the > 'turtle' of a tightly constrained > > 'number reality' (e.g. AR+CT+UDA). The 'modest' assumption here > > is that not to force 'faith' in comp, but rather study and test it for > its interesting and surprising results and generative power. The most > powerful result would be to pin down the 'emergence direction' of > 1-person <--> 3-person once and for all. > > [COLIN] > Yes. This denial really freaks me out. It makes cosmology a religion. As a > scientist I cannot tolerate it. > > RE: COMP > I have a calculus (a heuristic for one, really) called 'entropy calculus', > EC, which I think (not sure yet but confidence rising) might be able to be > thought of an actual instance of COMP based on the real occurrence (rough > coincidence) of an extravagently huge number of identical primitives > (which operate as axioms). Each axiom can be viewed as a 'mathematician'. > The calculus is massively parallel mathematics (not singular/serial, as > driven by a lone classical mathematician pushing a proof along). The > current state of the cooperative efforts of all the mathematicians > ....whose relationships are iterative rules of > inference/transformation.... literally is reality. There is one massive > rolling 'proof' unfolding without end. > > My maths skills are not strong enough to deal with all the nuances of > Bruno's ideas, but I have picked up on key relata. The main point: There > is no abstraction/modelling going on. This is not a computation but a > COMPutation. At least I think it can be viewed this way. What Bruno's work > does is to explore the general features of it. The only problem I have > with it is if you say that COMP can happen as a result of > constructing a computational 'as-if' substrate made of our reality - then > every practically useful thing about COMP dissappears (there is no 'actual > being' in the analyses of COMP, only notional indicators of those aspect > that might correspond to 'being'). > > So on that proviso - that reality is a literal instantation of _a_ COMP > then... > > If reality = state of the proof, then > (a) physical stuff = a proof in EC = matter. These are proven truths in EC. > (b) the unproven truths in EC are, in effect, 'virtual matter' > > The pactical view: > 2 mathematicians A, B working together(coherent) prove 3 theorems. > (i) A (matter) > (ii) B (matter) > (iii) A with respect to B (virtual matter) > > neither mathematician A nor B physically 'proves' (iii), it is implicit in > the act of (i) and (ii) that their relationship (iii) is just as well > defined as (i) and (ii). It's just that no mathematician actually does the > proof. It's inherent in the parallelism of the situation. > so... > The relationship ME_AS_MATTER (proof) and NOT-ME (all the rest of matter > as other proofs) is a massive collection of unproven truths in EC. This is > the 'latent perspective view' of NOT_ME from ME that I speak of. This is > NOT 1-person as discussed above, but latent 1-person, actually used by the > brain to construct 1-person. Parallelism is intrinsic to the situation - > so if a COMP implementation enforces any loss of parallelism COMP will > never be able to claim that the resulting system has any consciousness. > That's I think is the essence of the only problem I have with COMP. > > > In other words: > > REALITY is a COMPUTATION on a natural axiom set? YES. > COMPUTATION manfactured of an existing reality constructs a REALITY? NO. > > btw... > > Ql. What if mathematician A, modifies (i) to 'act as-if' (ii) existed? > Voila QUALIA can be piggybacked off the 'latent view' = virtual matter = > virtual proof (iii). Takes a while to get used to this. > > Q2. Does this not mean that "associative memory" is literally "inductive > inference" that creates a 'truth' in EC that could be regarded 'a useful > but unproven lie' about reality = empirical knowledge implemented in EC? > > There you have an ontolgy and a derivative empistemology implemented in EC. > > Also.. re 'turtles' > The turtles in EC are merely fluctuations. They are what would could be > called 'loops' in QM. Recursivity = nested loops. Anything with a result = > 1 loop can combine with any other loop...thus with loops you can make > everything (including strings). The ultimate 'biggee' fluctuation = the > whole universe. Everything is the same at all scales. > > so... > > Maybe bruno can calibrate the terms in COMP jargon so we're all on the > same page. The EC, as an actual instance (or a class of instances) of > COMP, should be able to be expressed in COMP terms, but I don't know how. > I'd like to write it all up - as it is predictive of the behaviour of > brain material in the way that Bruno wants COMP to be empirically > testable. At least that's what I am beginning to think, having beaten my > head over his maths for a while (my brain hurts). > > so when you say: > "> is that not to force 'faith' in comp, but rather study and test it for > its interesting and surprising results and generative power. The most > powerful result would be to pin down the 'emergence direction' of > 1-person <--> 3-person once and for all." > > This is how I would look at it: I got to EC just via Godel/Church/Turing > and thinking in real terms. Bruno has, I think, generalised the whole > process but not fully grasped the reification of it ...or more likely :-) > .... I have not fully grasped his notions of reification. Calulus based on > non-numerics must seem weird to a mathematician, but there are no > 'numbers' in our EC reality, only fluctuations in aggregate that have > properties 'sufficiently like' numbers to create the local calculii we > identify as 'empiirical laws of nature'. > > If you could help me relate EC to COMP it'd be a big help. I think there > might be a TOE in here someplace via a reified COMP instantated as EC that > is empirically supported but ONLY testable in brain material. Just an > idea. > > How'd we get here from the original thread question? Whew! I blame that > person! :-) > > cheers, > colin hales --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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