Le 17-oct.-06, à 22:18, David Nyman a écrit :

> This is a really confusing (to me) aspect of comp v. 'standard
> computationalism' (and too often no clear distinction is made). Bruno
> argues (8th step of the UDA) - and I follow him in this - that for
> consciousness to supervene on computationalism, 'matter' can serve no
> explanatory role other than that of a placeholder for the 'relata'.


> Hence, under comp, 'matter' emerges from 'number', not vice versa.


> The
> 'yes doctor' argument appears to appeal to the possibility of 'actual
> material hardware' being utilised to instantiate consciousness
> computationally.

Yes. But it is explicitly a "supplementary hypothesis", which is 
introduced for making the thought experiment easier, and which is 
eliminated later. (The "beginners version" in eight step makes this 
less explicitly, look at the older version in 15 steps perhaps).

> But there is still the crucial issue of 'substitution
> level' - instantiation must occur at the right layer of the hierarchy
> of nesting / recursion, so I suppose that in terms of this hierarchy,
> all notions of 'hardware' are themselves relational emergents.

Yes. Matter has to be redefine in term of a measure of the infinitely 
many computational histories going through my states, and which are 
undistinguishable relatively to the substitution level. Comp predicts 
that if we look at ourself below our substitution level, then we can 
measure the comp first person plural indeterminacy. That makes comp 
testable, and even already confirmed by the quantum indeterminacy 
(qualitatively with UDA), quasi-quantitatively by AUDA.

> No final
> theory of this appears to exist at present - ... <snip>

Yes yes it exists. UDA even shows that you got it by interviewing a 
self-introspecting universal machine. That is something I try to 
explain from time top time in the list, but the hardness comes from the 
fact that it needs some knowledge in logic and computer science (and 
then people complained 'cause it is technical).

Do you have some background in mathematical logic?



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