Bruno Marchal wrote:

> Yes. Matter has to be redefine in term of a measure of the infinitely
> many computational histories going through my states, and which are
> undistinguishable relatively to the substitution level. Comp predicts
> that if we look at ourself below our substitution level, then we can
> measure the comp first person plural indeterminacy. That makes comp
> testable, and even already confirmed by the quantum indeterminacy
> (qualitatively with UDA), quasi-quantitatively by AUDA.

These issues of testability and confirmation seem central. Could you
articulate this in a more extended way?

> > No final
> > theory of this appears to exist at present

I meant that the 'faith' aspect of 'yes doctor' seems to imply that
there is no certainty of the doctor having chosen the correct
substitution level, or indeed demonstrating what this level is. Am I
failing to grasp some aspect of this?

> Yes yes it exists. UDA even shows that you got it by interviewing a
> self-introspecting universal machine. That is something I try to
> explain from time top time in the list, but the hardness comes from the
> fact that it needs some knowledge in logic and computer science (and
> then people complained 'cause it is technical).
>
> Do you have some background in mathematical logic?

I'm many, many years from my mathematical education - which in any case
didn't include this area - so I'm busking it! However, If you're
willing to articulate and explain the formal steps, I'm prepared to do
some homework to master it. BTW, the recent flurry of posts on related
aspects of comp seem to show yet again that some of your most basic
points have not registered yet. I'm not sure we can avoid (realising of
course the pressures on your time) getting back to  - THE ROADMAP.

David

> Le 17-oct.-06, à 22:18, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> > This is a really confusing (to me) aspect of comp v. 'standard
> > computationalism' (and too often no clear distinction is made). Bruno
> > argues (8th step of the UDA) - and I follow him in this - that for
> > consciousness to supervene on computationalism, 'matter' can serve no
> > explanatory role other than that of a placeholder for the 'relata'.
>
>
> OK.
>
>
>
> > Hence, under comp, 'matter' emerges from 'number', not vice versa.
>
>
> OK.
>
>
> > The
> > 'yes doctor' argument appears to appeal to the possibility of 'actual
> > material hardware' being utilised to instantiate consciousness
> > computationally.
>
> Yes. But it is explicitly a "supplementary hypothesis", which is
> introduced for making the thought experiment easier, and which is
> eliminated later. (The "beginners version" in eight step makes this
> less explicitly, look at the older version in 15 steps perhaps).
>
>
>
>
> > But there is still the crucial issue of 'substitution
> > level' - instantiation must occur at the right layer of the hierarchy
> > of nesting / recursion, so I suppose that in terms of this hierarchy,
> > all notions of 'hardware' are themselves relational emergents.
>
>
> Yes. Matter has to be redefine in term of a measure of the infinitely
> many computational histories going through my states, and which are
> undistinguishable relatively to the substitution level. Comp predicts
> that if we look at ourself below our substitution level, then we can
> measure the comp first person plural indeterminacy. That makes comp
> testable, and even already confirmed by the quantum indeterminacy
> (qualitatively with UDA), quasi-quantitatively by AUDA.
>
>
> > No final
> > theory of this appears to exist at present - ... <snip>
>
> Yes yes it exists. UDA even shows that you got it by interviewing a
> self-introspecting universal machine. That is something I try to
> explain from time top time in the list, but the hardness comes from the
> fact that it needs some knowledge in logic and computer science (and
> then people complained 'cause it is technical).
>
> Do you have some background in mathematical logic?
> 
> Bruno
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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