Le 22-nov.-06, à 18:26, Tom Caylor a écrit :
>> The eight hypostases:
> OK. I follow all of your logic (propositional calculus) once we get
> into it. There are two problems with going too far in this. One has
> been noted before, that this is pretty technical stuff, although I
> enjoy it and would like to hear it out.
Thanks. Sometimes I think I have arrived at the limit of what I can
explain about my work in this list.
> The other problem is how all
> of this logic connects to Everything. That is why I am trying to
> understand the 0-person. I think questioning the 0-person might be the
> same thing as questioning the assumption of Arithmetic Realism (AR),
> but I'm not sure.
You are mainly right. Strictly speaking any sufficiently rich notion of
truth would work. If you are interested in the theology of an "angel"
(a non turing emulable entity like Analysis + omega rule (anomega)) you
will have to take a notion of analytical truth, but for any digital
machine arithmetical truth is enough (even for ZF, but this is hard to
show: better to take the X-notion of truth for a machine talking on
Anyone believing in a notion of independent (from oneself) truth
believes in a notion of zero-person. With comp AR is enough.
> In the past it may have sounded like I was
> supporting AR, but actually I was just arguing that physicalism is not
> any more well founded than AR.
I agree with this. To be sure I have not yet meet anyone who does not
believe in AR. (I have meet many who pretend not to believe in AR, but
that is different: they put in AR much more than I put in, in general
as a way for escaping the uda consequences, I guess).
> What I am worried about is that all of
> the fancy calculus might end up being something like string theory,
> beautiful but how can it be proven that it is the key to understanding
> and living in the world around us?
To be honest, if comp ends with a physical theory like string theory,
it would be quite marvellous, despite current critics against it (which
I don't take seriously).
Now I do expect, or at least I am collecting evidence that the 3th
hypostases (the soul + acomp), i.e. S4Grz1, could lead to a "loop
gravity" type of everything theory, and the 4th or 5th hypostases (the
intelligible and sensible matter) could lead to string type theories.
But honestly this is still speculative, and the comp physics is not so
Now, there is an important sense making the comp-physics far in advance
compared to what physicists have done. Indeed physicist does not tackle
the mind body problem and does not have any tool to address it, I mean
they have no tools to distinguish the communicable part of physics and
the non-communicable part. Comp uses the G* minus G difference to makes
sense of those fundamental nuances. It makes comp a theory of
everything communicable and non communicable. In that sense the comp
theory explains much more fundamental things. Strictly speaking,
without (a)comp, we have just no tools to distinguish the
scientist-prover, the knower, observation and anticipation.
>>> 2. This 0-person cannot be the basis for saying that the scientific
>>> discourse (and allegedly the Everything List discussions) has to have
>>> an impersonal basis. As you say, this 0-person has no discourse.
>>> the hypothetical existence of a 0-person does not rule out the
>>> existence of person at the deepest level to which we can relate (as
>> The trick is that a lobian machine as rich as ZF is able to prove the
>> whole (provable and unprovable by PA) theology of a simpler lobian
>> machine like PA. There is nothing hypothetical in the notion of
>> "arithmetical truth" from the pov of a rich (set theoretically based)
>> lobian machine. Faith arrives only when a machine begins to bet on its
>> *own* correct theology, i.e. its *own* G* if you want (or G* minus G).
> Here you talk as if the 0-person is always relative to a given limited
> G. But above you say that the 0-person is viewed from outside
> everywhere (nowhere), i.e. an absolute notion. Which is it?
The zero person is not relative to a person. But G is the "INTELLECT",
and G* is the "DIVINE INTELLECT" that is the "truth on the intellect".
As logics, G and G* are universal. I mean they are sound and complete
for any sound lobian machine or entity (angels). But their arithmetical
intepretation are relative and indeed are indexical. Example: take the
second incompleteness theorem "~Bf -> ~B(~Bf)", i.e.:
NOT PROVABLE FALSE entails NOT PROVABLE (NOT PROVABLE FALSE)
This is a theorem of G (and thus of G* which extends G). But "provable"
means for any machine "provable by me", and so the arithmetical meaning
of the "B" is different from one machine to another.
On the contrary the 0-person can be seen as a big undifferentiate truth
which does not even mention any machine (or if it does, it does it in
some trivial way).
>>> I believe the reasoning behind an impersonal basis is based
>>> on the desire to get away from the personal at the core level of
>> I don't think so. It comes only from the scientist desire to get away
>> of first person truth in the scientific discourse. Actually, the cute
>> thing here is that we get a extremely powerful defense of the
>> of the first person, at the core level of being (despite the need to
>> restrict the scientific discourse in the third person discourse).
> Doesn't the 3rd person provide the discourse of 1st person?
Yes, but only because the knower is defined by "Bp & p" in the language
of the machine. This is due to the fact that I limit my interview with
the machine on the third person provable (or bettable) propositions.
But from the S4Grz logic you can manage to interview directly the first
person associated to the sound lobian machine. That gives a
intuitionist view of the mathematical reality, with an unameable self
which has the tendency of wanting control everything ... Something akin
to Brouwer original motivation for a theory of a subject/consciousness.
It is interesting but premature.
> Again, why
> is the 0-person needed?
> You didn't answer that question above; you
> simply restated what the 0-person is.
I don't think we needed, we just cannot avoid it. Like AR is needed for
giving sense to the Church Thesis.
> So the 3rd person is the discourse of the 1st person. OK.
I am not sure this is correct. The 3rd person = the scientist = the 3rd
person discourse = the one described by G (for the communicable part)
and by G* for the non communicable part.
Now, the third person discourse can be used to study, in some
scientific way, the first person discourse, but that first person is
completely different from the third, and have completely different
discourse, almost opposite, despite G* (but only G*) knowing there is
no difference in the set of arithmetical propositions they can prove.
> simply labeling what's there. It isn't trying to get away from 1st
> person truth. We don't have to *try* to get away from 1st person
> truth. When we say anything about 1st person we *automatically* are in
> the 3rd person by definition.
If by "we" you mean the scientist, then I agree.
> What I am calling into question is the need for 0-person, and the
> motive for saying we need it. As I stated before, I think it is an
> attempt to elevate the impersonal to the "god" level. That way we
> don't have to worry about the personal at the core of being because
> we've artifically stuck the impersonal at the core.
Well, I do this through auda, but just because 99,999% of the scientist
(including me) estimate that we have to build our scientific theories
in a third person way, and they suspect the UDA to rely too much on the
first person (which is debatable). In AUDA I make clear that the
iincompleteness gives sense to nuances which appears only in UDA by
heavy appeal on "folk psychology". This is due in great part to the
fact that I have been obliged to defend all this in a faculty of
science. Would I have done philosophical studies, I could have
concentrate myself only on the UDA, but of course I have discovered the
AUDA together with the UDA.
>> Exercice: show that the UD is not a Universal Machine (at all). It is
>> enough to show that the UD cannot crash. Indeed it has no inputs! (Now
>> there is a sense in which we could say that the UD is "borned crashed"
>> given that it is programmed for non stopping (my usual definition of
>> crashed). So there is a sense to say that the UD is a "crashed
>> universal machine".
> The other definition of crashing is that the machine takes an input for
> which the output is not defined. So since the UD does not have an
> input, crashing is not possible.
> I also see your reasoning about the "crashed UM" based on your usual
> definition of crashed. But this makes me think that I should not trust
> the output of the UD, if it is "crashed".
But the UD has no output. Extensionally the UD is a function from
nothing to nothing (like any big whole).
Note that the UD is the comp accessible part of the zero-person. (But
this is something I cannot explain before saying more on the
> So would you call a machine
> that generates the natural numbers a crashed machine? Probably just a
> linguistic curiosity.
I would modelize such a machine by a Wi instead of a Fi, in this case.
The UD really generates nothing, but implicitly its trace.
>>> Weyl quote is interesting though in that it cites the infinite in the
>>> first half in reference to good, and it cites our finiteness in the
>>> second half in reference to evil.
>>> I would say that our finiteness (or other limitations such as a need
>>> for a particular reference frame) is not sufficient for the existence
>>> of evil.
>> Yes, evil belongs intrinsically to the realm of the ideally correct
>> self-observing universal machine.
> Again, simply realizing our own limitations is not cause for doing
> evil. It is when we are dissatified with our own limitations, and we
> want to elevate ourselves above where we are, that we are tempted to do
> evil. We are finite, so there will always be a level at which it will
> be impossible for us to see truth and operate in it. Elevating our
> understanding inside of our capabilities is good, I am not discounting
> that. But it is a simple mathematical problem that we will always find
> a limit to what we can do. This is fine. No evil yet. But it is when
> we try to go above that limit at all costs, taking "more is better" as
> our ultimate motto, that we end up stepping on others to do it.
I was using evil in the quasi-benacerafian sense. Evil is just DBf. The
consistency of inconsistency forced by the second incompleteness
> So what is the answer? What is the "balance" (not a good word) between
> a) staying within our limits and b) the expanding our knowledge by a
> combination of leaps of intuition and logical inference?
Only the first person do that, but then the first person is locally
immune to the evil. Globally, there is a "tension" between first and
third person, and this makes sense through the existence of the first
person plural (whre inconsistencies become contagious from a person to
> I have a view
> of this, but it will be good to get others' views also.
> Hint: I think
> this is connected to Stathis' post, that this is where faith comes in.
> More later.
Faith comes from the guessability of the non provable truth, like the
belief in a reality, or in a "god" (or in a zero-person pov) ...
>>> This is my point. We go too far when we let our view of the "natural
>>> order" (or "god"!) be the dictator of what can happen. Indeed this
>>> actually making ourselves the center of the universe (multiverse).
>>> This is against the true essence of spirituality.
>> I agree with you. "Naturalism" as implicit metaphysics or theology is
>> as fake as any form of authoritative dogma. Of course a *doubting*
>> naturalist can remain scientific. But a naturalist who says that when
>> we die, we will not born again (like many materialist believes) is
>> "religious" in the worst sense of the word. The truth is that we don't
>> know, but can propose theories.
>> With comp, it is easy to kill oneself ... locally. It is harder ...
>> globally. With comp it remains possible that consciousness is a sort
>> of prison, as Otto Rossler extracts from Descartes (I agree with him
> It is interesting that strict naturalism is a prison,
In which sense? I don't think this is related to the Rossler view of
Descartes. I see Rossler put a video on this on the net, but it is in
see also the pdf: http://1010.co.uk/ottoroesslertranscript.pdf
(search for "Descartes")
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