Le 24-nov.-06, à 05:48, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
> I agree very 'not interesting' ... a bit like saying "assuming comp" > endlessly.....and never being able to give it teeth. I guess you don't know about my work (thesis). I know there are some "philosopher" who considers it controversial, but it is not a work in philosophy (in the current usage in europa at least) and nothing in it is "third person" controversed actually (to my knowledge). Comp makes the physical science emerging from number theory, and I show how to make the derivation constructively, by interviewing an arithmetically sound "platonist" universal machine. The term "platonist" can be used in the formal sense that the machine asserts (A v ~A) for any arithmetical propositions. And this makes comp (actually a weaker form of comp) empirically falsifiable. > > ... I am more interested in proving scientists aren't/can't be > zombies....that it seems to also challenge computationalism in a > certain > sense... this is a byproduct I can't help, not the central issue. I can have a lot of sympathy for an argument showing that science cannot be done without consciousness (I personaly do believe this!). But if the byproduct is that machine cannot be conscious, then I think it will make your argument far less interesting, and, by Church thesis, necessarily non effective (if it was a machine would be able to produce it). Actually, the acomp hypostases can already been used to explain why machines will develop argument why their own consciousness are special and cannot be attached to any describable machine in a provable way (and they will be 1-correct!!!). It is the diabolical (somehow godelian) prediction of comp: machines will not believe in comp, just bet on it in some circumstance. In a preceding post you wrote: >> >> Bruno: I would separate completely "computations" which is an >> absolute notion >> (at least with Church thesis), and "proof" which has sense only >> relatively to the choice of a formal system, or theory, or machine. >> > > OK. It tend to mix them without thinking...The process is mixed in my > mind. It could be because I can see reality as a formal system. The distinction between computability and provability is fundamental for the AUDA. Alas, you are not the only one who miss the distinction, but explanation of this has to be a bit more technical. I have already attempted some explanation, but it is perhaps too hard to convey in a non technical list. I don't know, presently. Now, seeing reality as a formal system ? that does not make sense for me. Arithmetical reality is already beyond all formal systems except infinite "divine" one like the An-omega angels (which in their analytical context suffer the same limitations, and obeys too to G and G*, cf Boolos 93). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
