Le 27-nov.-06, à 02:31, David Nyman a écrit :
> On Nov 26, 11:50 pm, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Why use the word if you don't like the concept?
> I've been away for a bit and I can't pretend to have absorbed all the
> nuances of this thread but I have some observations.
> 1. To coherently conceive that a PZ which is a *functional* (not
> physical) duplicate can nonetheless lack PC - and for this to make any
> necessary difference to its possible behaviour - we must believe that
> the PZ thereby lacks some crucial information.
> 2. Such missing information consequently can't be captured by any
> purely *functional* description (however defined) of the non-PZ
Such missing information can't be captured in any "provable way" by a
functional description (but assuming comp it exists, we just cannot
know it exists).
> 3. Hence having PC must entail the possession and utilisation of
> information which *in principle* is not functionally (3-person)
... by us, or by the original copied person;
> but which, in *instantiating* 3-person data, permits it to
> be contextualised, differentiated, and actioned in a manner not
> reproducible by any purely functional (as opposed to constructable)
OK. Necessarily so with the explicit comp hyp.
> Now this seems to tally with what Colin is saying about the crucial
> distinction between the *content* of PC and whatever is producing it.
I thought so, at least. (But Colin is more cautious in his paper, less
in his posts).
> It implies that whatever is producing it isn't reducible to sharable
> 3-person quanta.
Yes. For the same reason that after a WM duplication, the fact that you
feel to be in W cannot be reduced to any third person description.
> This seems also (although I may be confused) to square
> with Bruno's claims for COMP that the sharable 3-person emerges from
> (i.e. is instantiated by) the 1-person level.
Hmmm.... I would say OK, but the word "instantiated" can be misleading.
There is only types, and some are less abstract than other, and thus
"more instantiated", but it is a question of degree. In that sense the
sharable physics can be said to emerge from 1-person level (singular,
plural, sensible) person povs.
> As he puts it -'quanta
> are sharable qualia'.
Yes, but this was a statement by the lobian machine which made me doubt
the comp-physics could make sense until I read Everett where indeed
quanta can make sense only from first person plural pov. In that sense
comp predicts the multiplication of *population of individuals".
(and from this we can expect to be able to derive the "right" tensor
product for comp states and histories, but I have not succeed to do it
properly yet. This is because I derive a quantum logic only, and (as
quantum logician know) quantum logic cannot justify easily the tensor
> IOW, the observable - quanta - is the set of
> possible transactions between functionally definable entities
> instantiated at a deeper level of representation (the constitutive
Hoping they have the right measure. This is, assuming comp, testable,
making comp testable (popper-falsifiable)..
> This is why we see brains not minds.
> It seems to me that the above, or something like it, must be true if we
> are to take the lessons of the PZ to heart. IOW, the information
> instantiated by PC is in principle inaccessible to a PZ because the
> specification of the PZ as a purely functional 3-person analog is
> unable to capture the necessary constitutive information. The
> specification is at the wrong level.
Indeed, and that is why the philosophical zombie will remain
"philosophical". The PZ, like the movie of the boolean graph, will be a
Zombie only relatively to us. From its "point of view", he will survive
in any relative continuations/instantiations which will complete its
functional deficit (Note that this happens all the time in the Albert
Loewer Many Mind interpretation of QM (in which all third person in
"your" branch are zombies: with comp this should be exceptional, like
in Everett. Somehow a philosophical zombie has the same probability to
remain in "your branches" than you (1-pov) have to stay in a Harry
Potter region of the (comp) multiverses (= negligible proba).
> It's like trying to physically
> generate a new computer by simply running more and more complex
> programs on the old one. It's only by *constructing* a physical
> duplicate (or some equivalent physical analog) that the critical
> constitutive - or instantiating - information can be captured.
I would say it is just by making the instantiations at the right level
(or below), but it always concerned possible sheaf of
instantiations/continuations. There is no token, no "real"
> We have to face it. We won't find PC 'out there' - if we could, it
> would (literally) be staring us in the face. I think what Colin is
> trying to do is to discover how we can still do science on PC despite
> the fact that whatever is producing it isn't capturable by 'the
> observables', but rather only in the direct process and experience of
> observation itself.
Perhaps. I got a similar feeling when reading Colin's paper, but this
is less clear in his posts where he want PC for having science, where
PC is needed only for having genuine personal doubt in the process of
doing science. PC gives sense to science, obviously.
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