Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> What about when multiple equally valid OM's exist? I don't agree that they 
> are all perceived.
> If I am to be duplicated and one of the copies tortured, I am worried, 
> because this is subjectively
> equivalent to expecting torture with 1/2 probability. Post-duplication, I can 
> only experience
> being one of the copies, and if I am not the one who is tortured, I am 
> relieved, although I feel
> sorry for the other copy in the same way I might feel sory about anyone else 
> who is suffering
> (maybe a bit more, given our shared past). This is no more than a description 
> of how our
> psychology as beings who feel themselves to be embedded in linear time works. 
> Arguments that
> this does not reflect the reality of the situation, that it does not make 
> sense to consider I might
> "become" either copy prior to the duplication but only one copy after the 
> duplication, do not change
> the way my brain forces me to feel about it. Lee Corbin on this list has 
> argued that I should consider
> both copies as selves at all times, and perhaps we would evolve to think this 
> way in a world where
> duplication was commonplace, but our brains aren't wired that way at present.

In saying you disagree that duplicate OM's perspectives are perceived,
I take it that you mean their collective divergent experiences are not
integrated in a consistent memory, not that they would be non-conscious
zombies.  If this was your point, I agree.

However, I see a difference of opinion in how we understand the
probabilities.  Whereas you say prior to the duplication and torture,
one has a 1/2 probability of being tortured and 1/2 probability of
being spared, I see it as one having a 100% probability of being
tortured AND a 100% probability of being spared, as both experiences
occur with 100% certainty.  The probability that an observer-moment
sampled from both perspectives post-duplication will remember being
tortured would be 1/2.

Our brains may not be wired for experiencing total empathy for others
who are suffering, but this is a result of evolutionary psychology.
Perhaps a species whose brains were wired this way would be maximally
moral, as they would be intolerant to any suffering and would operate
at great risk to themselves to aid other individuals.


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at

Reply via email to