On Jan 27, 6:52�am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Le 26-janv.-07, � 15:13, Mark Peaty a �crit :
> > �Bruno:
> > �" 4) Mark Peaty wrote (to Brent):
> >> As I say, the essence of evil is the act of treating other persons as
> >> things.
> > �I so agree with you. And then, with Church thesis (less than comp,
> > thus) you can understand the reason why even some (relative) machine
> > and some (relative) numbers should not be confused with any of their
> > third person description. "
> > �MP: There is too much packed in this for me to be clear of the scope.
> > �For example: by 'machine' do you mean, generically, any hypothetical
> > self-referencing, sufficiently complex device - or virtual emulation
> > of such - smart enough to think it knows who it is?
> > �and
> > �Which numbers have anything BUT a third person description?

> I can explain (see UDA) why if you assume comp, numbers get private
> first person relation with respect to other numbers or with unameable,
> from their point of view, set of numbers. I have to use the Wi and Fi
> to explain this. I do identify machine and their godel numbers (or any
> finite description of the machine) at some point.

The question of the "meaning of life", and also the problem of (the 
existence of) evil (whether you believe in God not), has at its core 
the question of what is this "non-thing" entity called a "person"?

By the way, the problem of evil that I am referring to is simply the 
problem of the existence of evil.  We just know it exists.  We see 
people treated as things. We know it is wrong.  The simple existence 
of evil is a problem.  I'm not talking about the wrongness of a 
logical contradiction.  I'm talking about something that is even 
"wronger than" that.  When I talk about the problem of evil,  I'm 
talking about something that is *really* wrong, down at the core level 
of reality.  The reason that something defined by persons (such as a 
person being treated as a "non-person") can be "really wrong" at the 
deepest level is that the essence of a person is something that lies 
at the deepest level of reality.  This is why the "problem of evil" in 
general has been so hard to "figure out".  It's because the very 
definition of the problem is illusive without defining what a person 
is.  We try to define the problem by saying evil is a logical 
contradiction with whatever theory someone has, but this actually only 
proves even more how lost we are in figuring it out, and even more 
lost in solving it.

In the same way the "meaning of life" question on one hand seems 
nebulous and unuseful from a scientific viewpoint.  But it is the 
ultimate question.  We may ask, "What is the meaning of the 'meaning 
of life'?" But that just illustrates the meaning of the question 
itself. Perhaps this is one of the attributes of a "person", that we 
continually, recursively, as the question of meaning.  We just *know* 
what the meaning is of the question, "What is the meaning of life?" 
Thus, the essence of what a person is is key to this question, and key 
to the answer!

Now when it comes to mathematical/logical systems, and Bruno's 
arguments, I think that we can see a "type", or analogy, of what is 
going on here.  Through arguments that use things such as Church's 
Thesis, diagonalization, the excluded middle, we can see that there 
are always some systems or sets which are provably not describable by 
other systems or sets.  I don't think this ultimately resolves the 
problem of evil or the meaning of life.  But I do think that it is 
perhaps a "picture" of the limitlessness that is possible, even 
necessary.  It shows us the infinite proportions of these problems.  
They are intractable by human persons, and yet have at their core the 
essence of what a person is.


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to