On Jan 27, 6:52ï¿½am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Le 26-janv.-07, ï¿½ 15:13, Mark Peaty a ï¿½crit :
> > ï¿½Bruno:
> > ï¿½" 4) Mark Peaty wrote (to Brent):
> >> As I say, the essence of evil is the act of treating other persons as
> >> things.
> > ï¿½I so agree with you. And then, with Church thesis (less than comp,
> > thus) you can understand the reason why even some (relative) machine
> > and some (relative) numbers should not be confused with any of their
> > third person description. "
> > ï¿½MP: There is too much packed in this for me to be clear of the scope.
> > ï¿½For example: by 'machine' do you mean, generically, any hypothetical
> > self-referencing, sufficiently complex device - or virtual emulation
> > of such - smart enough to think it knows who it is?
> > ï¿½and
> > ï¿½Which numbers have anything BUT a third person description?
> I can explain (see UDA) why if you assume comp, numbers get private
> first person relation with respect to other numbers or with unameable,
> from their point of view, set of numbers. I have to use the Wi and Fi
> to explain this. I do identify machine and their godel numbers (or any
> finite description of the machine) at some point.
The question of the "meaning of life", and also the problem of (the
existence of) evil (whether you believe in God not), has at its core
the question of what is this "non-thing" entity called a "person"?
By the way, the problem of evil that I am referring to is simply the
problem of the existence of evil. We just know it exists. We see
people treated as things. We know it is wrong. The simple existence
of evil is a problem. I'm not talking about the wrongness of a
logical contradiction. I'm talking about something that is even
"wronger than" that. When I talk about the problem of evil, I'm
talking about something that is *really* wrong, down at the core level
of reality. The reason that something defined by persons (such as a
person being treated as a "non-person") can be "really wrong" at the
deepest level is that the essence of a person is something that lies
at the deepest level of reality. This is why the "problem of evil" in
general has been so hard to "figure out". It's because the very
definition of the problem is illusive without defining what a person
is. We try to define the problem by saying evil is a logical
contradiction with whatever theory someone has, but this actually only
proves even more how lost we are in figuring it out, and even more
lost in solving it.
In the same way the "meaning of life" question on one hand seems
nebulous and unuseful from a scientific viewpoint. But it is the
ultimate question. We may ask, "What is the meaning of the 'meaning
of life'?" But that just illustrates the meaning of the question
itself. Perhaps this is one of the attributes of a "person", that we
continually, recursively, as the question of meaning. We just *know*
what the meaning is of the question, "What is the meaning of life?"
Thus, the essence of what a person is is key to this question, and key
to the answer!
Now when it comes to mathematical/logical systems, and Bruno's
arguments, I think that we can see a "type", or analogy, of what is
going on here. Through arguments that use things such as Church's
Thesis, diagonalization, the excluded middle, we can see that there
are always some systems or sets which are provably not describable by
other systems or sets. I don't think this ultimately resolves the
problem of evil or the meaning of life. But I do think that it is
perhaps a "picture" of the limitlessness that is possible, even
necessary. It shows us the infinite proportions of these problems.
They are intractable by human persons, and yet have at their core the
essence of what a person is.
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