Le 29-janv.-07, à 06:07, Tom Caylor a écrit :

>>> My above questions are perhaps a bit rhetorical in
>>> this sense. �I think the answer is that we long to find meaning 
>>> solely
>>> through science so that we can control everything, and so we *try* to
>>> erect science as the god over all meaning.
>> That is just scientism, not science. And then lobian machine are
>> already able to guess correctly that meaning or truth is much vaster
>> than reason or proof. You should love comp :-)
>> Bruno
> I'm glad I agree with you that the existence of the first-person (or
> meaning or truth) cannot be ignored through an eliminative proof.  But
> your comp seems also to be only eliminative in nature, noting the
> words above "vaster".  Thus meaning and truth are simply proved to be
> things that are beyond reach.

ZF can prove that PA-meaning and PA-truth is beyond PA. PA cannot prove 
that, but can guess it, or bet on it.
Actually all machine M1 can prove that M2-meaning is beyond M2.

Some machine cn prove this about herself in some conditional way.

No machine can prove its limitation in some absolute way (that would be 
akin to proving self-consistency).

> This doesn't seem to be very useful.

Well, about meaning and truth it is even beyond expression or 
definability. It is not less useful than saying that G... has no name 

> And yet you (have to?) believe that meaning and truth are "out there"
> somewhere ...

This can help. Hopefully only ...

> and that these systems/sets of proof are headed in the right
> direction. ...

You can prove it for a simpler lobian machine. Simpler than you. For 
*you*, relatively to you, indeed, IF comp is correct, you can only hope 
*you* are headed in the right direction. This can make you modest and 
cautious in fundamental matter, which could be good ethically (when you 
think about all the bads done by the uncartesian enemies of doubt.

> This seems to be saying that a fractal, as it gets
> increasingly complex, is approaching the truth.

This is correct for some algorithmic way to approach the Mandelbrot set 
(which can be considered as Truing equivalent, actually). But in 
provability matter things are more rich (cf the hypostases, etc.)

> This is not simply an
> analogy.  You are saying that a mathematical entity is approaching
> *the truth*, all the kinds of truth that there are, including the
> solution to the problem of evil, and the answer to the meaning of
> life.

Some machine can do that, but never in a provable way. I you want, this 
gives an universal algorithm for never moving away from God: never 
listen to anyone giving you an algorithm for approaching God ...

> The question of the "meaning of life", and also the problem of (the
> existence of) evil (whether you believe in God not), has at its core
> the question of what is this "non-thing" entity called a "person"?

Like Plotinus, I define the first person by the knower, and I define 
the incorrigible knower like Theaetetus and Plotinus as the correct 
believer, following the tradition who those who knows that, when awake, 
they cannot believe for sure they are awake, albeit we can know to be 
dreaming, wrong, etc.. Russell said once this is debatable, and indeed 
it is.

Oops I must go,

See you in two/three days,


BTW, I do think that the problem of evil is related to the fact that it 
is consistent that we could be inconsistent (= Godel II theorem in case 
"we" = a consistent lobian machine):  Dt -> DBf   (cf also Benacerraf: 
God, Godel, and the Devil, ref in my Lille thesis). Possible Evil could 
be a comp price to pay for Possible Freedom.


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