Brent Meeker writes:> Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2007 16:52:01 -0800> From: [EMAIL 
PROTECTED]> To:> Subject: Re: Rép : The 
Meaning of Life> > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:> > > > Bruno Marchal writes:> > 
> >> Le 23-janv.-07, à 06:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :> >>> >>>>> Searle's 
theory is that consciousness is a result of actual brain> >>>>> activity, not 
Turing emulable.> >>>> Nooooo....... True: Searle's theory is that 
consciousness is a result> >>>> of brain activity, but nowhere does Searle 
pretend that brain is not> >>>> turing emulable. He just implicitly assume 
there is a notion of> >>>> actuality that no simulation can render, but does 
not address the> >>>> question of emulability. Then Searle is known for 
confusing level of> >>>> description (this I can make much more precise with 
the Fi and Wi, or> >>>> with the very important difference between 
computability (emulability)> >>>> and provability.> >>> Searle seems to accept 
that CT implies the brain is Turing emulable, > >>> but he> >>> does not 
believe that such an emulation would capture consciousness any> >>> more than a 
simulation of a thunderstorm will make you wet. Thus, a > >>> computer> >>> 
that could pass the Turing Test would be a zombie.> >>> >> Yes. It confirms my 
point. And Searle is coherent, he has to refer to a > >> notion of "physically 
real" for his non-computationalism to proceed.> >> He may be right. Now his 
naturalistic explanation of consciousness > >> seems rather ad hoc.> >> But all 
what I say is that IF comp is correct, we have to abandon > >> physicalism.> 
>>> >>> >>> Searle is not a computationalist - does not believe in strong AI - 
but > >>> he does> >>> believe in weak AI. Penrose does not believe in weak AI 
either.> >> Yes. In that way Searle is "not even wrong".> > > > Meaning what? I 
thought you agreed his position was coherent.> >  > >> <snip: see my preceding 
post to you>> >>> >>> >>> If there are more arbitrary sequences than third 
person computations, > >>> how> >>> does it follow that arbitrary sequences are 
not computations?> >>> >> I guess I miss something (or you miss your 
statement?). Is it not > >> obvious that "if there are more arbitrary sequences 
than third person > >> computations, then some (even most) arbitrary sequences 
are not > >> computations".> > > > OK, but my concern was to find room in the 
arbitrary sequences for all > > computations, not the other way around (perhaps 
I didn't make this clear). > > Every rational number is also a real number. > > 
 > >> Let us define what is a computable infinite sequence. A sequence is > >> 
computable if there is a program (a machine) which generates > >> specifically 
the elements of that sequence in the right order, and > >> nothing else. The 
set of programs is enumerable, but by Cantor theorem > >> the set of *all* 
sequences is not enumerable. So the set of computable > >> sequences is almost 
negligible compared to the arbitrary one.> >>> >> Does it mean there is no 
program capable of generating a non computable > >> sequence?> >>> >> Not at 
all. A universal dovetailer generates all the infinite > >> sequences. The 
computable one, (that is, those nameable by special > >> purpose, specific,  
program) and the non computable one (how? by > >> generating them all).> >>> >> 
I give another example of the same subtlety. One day a computer > >> scientist 
told me that it was impossible to write a program of n bits > >> capable of 
generating an incompressible finite sequence or string of > >> length m with m 
far greater than n. I challenge him.> >> Of course, what is true is that there 
is no program of n bit capable of > >> generating that m bits incompressible 
string, AND ONLY, SPECIFICALLY,  > >> THAT STRING.> >> But it is really easy to 
write a little  program capable of generating > >> that incompressible string 
by letting him generate ALL strings: the > >> program COUNT is enough.> >>> >> 
I think this *is* the main line of the *everything* list, or a > >> miniature 
version of it if you want.> > > > Yes, and there are many related examples, 
like Borges' library; I would include > > the computations that might be hiding 
in noise as another such example. The > > significant thing in all these cases 
is that from the third person perspective, the > > information or computation 
is inaccessible. You need to have the book you want > > already before you can 
find it in the Library of Babel. However, if computations > > (or books) can be 
conscious, then they will still be conscious despite being unable > > to 
communicate with the world at the level of their implementation. The first 
person > > perspective makes these situations non-trivial.> > Or you may regard 
it as a reductio against the proposition that a consciousness can be 
encapsulated.  Perhaps consciousness is only relative to an open system.  If 
the universe started from nothing, or very little in terms of information, then 
the unitary evolution of the wave function preserves information.  Hence the 
information of the universe is very small.  The apparent information, including 
that which describes conscious processes, is a consequence of projecting out 
onto a reduced basis.Isn't the universe taken as a whole equivalent to an 
encapsulated virtual environment with no I/O interaction with the "outside" ? 
Also (an unrelated question), is it thought that structure and organisation in 
the universe will be evident at every scale, or if you stand back far enough 
might it look like a gas at a uniform temperature looks on a macroscopic scale? 
Stathis Papaioannou
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