Bruno marchal writes:
> Le 23-janv.-07, à 06:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > > Simplistically, I conceive of computations as mysterious abstract > > objects, like > > all other mathematical objects. Physical computers are devices which > > reflect > > these mathematical objects in order to achieve some practical purpose > > in the > > substrate of their implementation. A computer, an abacus, a set of > > fingers, > > pencil and paper can be used to compute 2+3=5, but these processes do > > not > > create the computation, they just make it accessible to the user. The > > fact that > > 2 birds land on a tree in South America and 3 elephants drink at a > > watering hole > > in Africa, or 2 atoms move to the left in a rock and 3 atoms move to > > the right > > is essentially the same process as the abacus, but it is useless, > > trivial, lost in > > randomness, escapes the notice of theories of computation - and > > rightly so. > > However, what about the special case where a more complex version of > > 2+3=5 > > on the abacus is conscious? Then I see no reason why the birds and the > > elephants > > or the atoms in a rock should not also implement the same > > consciousness, even > > though there is no possibility of interaction with the outside world > > due to the > > computation being lost in noise. What this really does is destroy the > > whole notion > > of physical supervenience: if you shot the elephants or smashed the > > rock, the > > computation could as easily spring from the new noise situation. Thus, > > it would > > appear that consciousness comes from computation as pure mathematical > > object, > > and is no more created by the physical process that addition is > > created by the > > physical process. Either that, or it isn't computational at all. > > > OK, so we do agree. > > > > > > >> The real question is not "does a rock implement computations", the > >> question is "does a rock implement computations in such a way as to > >> changed the relative measure of my (future) comp states in a relevant > >> way?" And for answering such question we need to know what a rock > >> really is, and both physics and comp are not near at all to answer > >> this. Comp has less trouble here because it does not have to reify any > >> primary reality associated to the rock, which already emerge locally > >> from many non material computations. > > > > No, as I implied above, a rock makes no difference whatsoever to the > > measure of > > computation it might be seen as implementing. > > OK. > So, now, we have to extract "physics" from computations if we assume > (even just standard comp). Do you agree with the UDA informal > conclusion? That is, that physics will be given by relative (cf RSSA) > measure on computational histories from some internal point of views? > Such a measure has to be observer invariant (I am not talking about the > content of what is measured, but about the general math of that > measure). In any case we must dig on computations and provability, if > only to get reasonable mathematical definition of those different > "person point of view". Yes, I agree, *given* comp. > PS Could someone give me the plural of "point of view" ? "points of view" Stathis Papaioannou _________________________________________________________________ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
