Bruno Marchal writes:> >> Let us define what is a computable infinite sequence. 
A sequence is> >> computable if there is a program (a machine) which generates> 
>> specifically the elements of that sequence in the right order, and> >> 
nothing else. The set of programs is enumerable, but by Cantor theorem> >> the 
set of *all* sequences is not enumerable. So the set of computable> >> 
sequences is almost negligible compared to the arbitrary one.> >>> >> Does it 
mean there is no program capable of generating a non > >> computable> >> 
sequence?> >>> >> Not at all. A universal dovetailer generates all the 
infinite> >> sequences. The computable one, (that is, those nameable by 
special> >> purpose, specific,  program) and the non computable one (how? by> 
>> generating them all).> >>> >> I give another example of the same subtlety. 
One day a computer> >> scientist told me that it was impossible to write a 
program of n bits> >> capable of generating an incompressible finite sequence 
or string of> >> length m with m far greater than n. I challenge him.> >> Of 
course, what is true is that there is no program of n bit capable > >> of> >> 
generating that m bits incompressible string, AND ONLY, SPECIFICALLY,> >> THAT 
STRING.> >> But it is really easy to write a little  program capable of 
generating> >> that incompressible string by letting him generate ALL strings: 
the> >> program COUNT is enough.> >>> >> I think this *is* the main line of the 
*everything* list, or a> >> miniature version of it if you want.> >> > Yes, and 
there are many related examples, like Borges' library; I > > would include> > 
the computations that might be hiding in noise as another such example.> > > We 
will have to go back on this. I would compare the Borges' library > (or its 
countable  infinite generalization) as equivalent with the > counting 
algorithm. It generates all (finite) strings, and a lot of > computations can 
be considered as being embedded in those strings. > Still I consider that the 
counting algorithm is not equivalent with a > universal dovetailer. I will try 
to explain the difference with some > details, but roughly speaking, what the 
UD does, and what neither the > rock nor the counting algorithm really do, is 
that the UD generates > both the program codes and their finite and infinite 
running. Saying > that all computations are generated by the counting algorithm 
makes > sense only if we add a universal interpreter in the description.> I can 
anticipate that you will say this does not change anything from > inside. But 
remember that once we abandon the "physical" supervenience > thesis, we will 
replace it by the computational supervenience thesis > which ask us to be 
precise of what is a mathematical computations. We > can no more relate on 
notion of time space, energy, etc.> The easy way to do that consists in 
defining in some axiomatics what > will be necessary for both the existence of 
computations and the > existence of internal observer related to those 
computations. In that > case a counting algorithm is just equivalent to the 
first three axiom > of Peano Arithmetic. This is provably not enough to define 
or execute > all programs. It appears that by adding the definition of addition 
and > multiplication (and order) you get the turing universal level (and then > 
with the induction axioms you get the internal lobian observer. > Everything 
will emerge from (mathematical interrelation between those > beings).> I'm 
afraid I'm not clear, and I will think how to make this clearer > without going 
to much into the technics.It seems to me that abstract machines have been 
created for our benefit, rather like mathematical notation or human language. 
That is, they allow us to think about algorithms and to consider how we might 
build a physical machine to carry them out, even if this is not actually done 
in practice. If you do away with the possibility of physical implementation and 
if you consider only first person experience, what purpose is served by an 
abstract machine? The quotient of two numbers does not depend on a long 
division algorithm, or any algorithm running on any  machine; it simply *is*.> 
> The> > significant thing in all these cases is that from the third person > > 
perspective, the> > information or computation is inaccessible. You need to 
have the book > > you want> > already before you can find it in the Library of 
Babel. However, if > > computations> > (or books) can be conscious, then they 
will still be conscious despite > > being unable> > to communicate with the 
world at the level of their implementation. > > The first person> > perspective 
makes these situations non-trivial.> > OK, but as far as they can communicate 
from their inside points of view > (btw: thanks for the spelling!) you are 
adding implicitly some addition > and multiplication laws. Once we stop to take 
for granted what exists > or not, such little nuance have some importance, 
especially for > deriving concretely physics from something else.Communicating 
with the outside world changes everything, but we can put a box around the 
whole system and declare it closed. This closed system (which may contain many 
interacting conscious entities) exists somewhere in the Library of Babel, in 
the output of the "count" program, in noise, in the decimal expansion of pi, 
etc., and even though we outside the the system cannot find it or interact with 
it, its inhabitants are going about their business regardless. > >> Now, when 
you run the UD, as far as you keep the discourse in the > >> third> >> person 
mode, everything remains enumerable, even in the limit.> >> But from the first 
person point of view, a priori the uncountable> >> stories, indeed generated by 
the UD, take precedence on the computable> >> one: thus the continua of white 
rabbits. This results from the lack of> >> any possibility from the first 
person point of view to locate herself> >> into UD*. Somehow the first person 
belongs to 2^aleph_zero histories > >> at> >> the start.> >> > Can you explain 
again why only the countable stories appear to the 3rd > > person> > but the 
1st person sees the uncountable ones as well? Also, why should > > the> > white 
rabbits prefer the uncountable habitat?> > > The computable stories can be said 
to be generated by programs, and > thus are enumerable (countable).> But the UD 
generates not only all programs and their execution, it > generates also all 
data, including all streams, all oracle, etc.> Of course he never generates a 
complete streams in one strike, but by > dovetailing on the reals (which can be 
defined by a finite subroutine, > he can present such real streams through 
finite but enough big portion > to some program who "want to read them".> Now, 
for an external observer everything at any time (or number of > steps of the 
running of the UD) is countable. We can see finite portion > of the stream to 
be generated with some advance and then presented to > the program, then we 
have to wait a billion years (say) to see the > "same program" getting a larger 
portion of its stream datum.> Now, put yourself in front of a concrete UD, like 
in step 7 of the > version of UDA in 8 steps.> cf the pdf slide:  >> To predict 
your "future history", and taking into account the first > person is unaware of 
delays of computation introduced by the UD (due to > its dovetaling), and 
taking into account that the UD generates all > programs infinitely often 
(necessarily), and taking into account that > the "probability measure" cannot 
bear on the computational states but > only on the (infinite) computational 
histories: all that entails that > you have to take into account ALL 
computational histories going through > your current state. Well, now take just 
into account the infinite > dumbness of the UD, which is that for all programs 
it will generate its > execution on all streams, and thus on all arbitrary 
sequences > (including first person descrition of white rabbits) which makes a 
non > countable set (!!!, by Cantor) then, well, then it *seems* we cannot > 
avoid white noise and flying pigs and all slight variants, etc... OK ? > (don't 
hesitate to say NO, I'm quick and it is not easy). Are you OK > with any 
"taking into account" described above?> Of course, such measure is a bit too 
much intuitive: a priori all > probabilities of histories add up, and we could 
a bit naively take this > as a refutation of comp. What refrains us to jump 
toward that > conclusion, is that such intuitive probabilities have not enough 
taken > into account the difference between the points of view, something any > 
self-referentially correct universal machine can be shown to be able to > do, 
thanks, not really to incompleteness, but thanks to the fact that > machine can 
reason about their own incompleteness (leading to the > arithmetical points of 
view/hypostases). This motivates then the AUDA > (Arithmetical version of UDA,  
... or of Plotinus, actually).OK, I think I understand why you can see all the 
arbitrary sequences from inside the UD but not the outside (it relates to the 
irrelevance of delays from the inside), but I don't see why these extra 
sequences should be more likely to encode white rabbit universes than the 3rd 
person observable ones. Also, I still don't understand how you will avoid the 
white rabbits.> >> A similar "explosion of stories" appears with quantum 
mechanics, > >> except> >> that here the physicist as an easy answer: white 
rabbits and Potter> >> universe are eliminated through phase randomization 
(apparently).> >>> >> I am not satisfied by this answer if only because my 
motivation is to> >> understand where that quantum comes from.> >>> >> Is 
complex randomization of histories the only way to force normal> >> nature into 
the shorter path?> >>> >> Well, my point is that if we take comp seriously, we 
have to justify> >> the absence of rabbits from computer science. In case too 
much white> >> rabbits remains, comp would be false, and this would be an 
argument in> >> favor of materialism. But, when you interview a universal 
machine on> >> this question you can realize at least that this question is far 
from> >> being settled.> >> > If QM emerges from comp, does that solve the 
problem?> > > As far as QM is confirmed by nature, if QM can be justified by 
comp, it > would mean nature confirms comp, and thus its immateriality. In this 
> sense the problem would be solved: materialism would be false. If QM is > 
confirmed by nature (an infinite process, note) and if comp predicts > 
something different, then it will depend. Some circumstances could lead > to 
argument in favor of materialism. I mean I can speculate about this.Stathis 
Get connected - Use your Hotmail address to sign into Windows Live Messenger 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at

Reply via email to