On 2/18/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

MP: Well at least I can say now that I have some inkling of what 'machine's
> theology' means. However, as far as I can see it is inherent in the nature
> of consciousness to reify something. I have not seen anywhere a refutation
> of my favoured understanding of consciousness which is that a brain is
> creating a representation of its world and a representation of itself and
> representations of the relationships between self and world. The 'world' in
> question is reified by the maintenance and updating of these
> representations, this is what the brain does, this is what it is FOR. Our
> contemplation of numbers and other mathematical objects or the abstract
> entities posited as particles and energy packets etc., by modern physics is
> experientially and logically second to the pre-linguistic/non-linguistic
> representation of self in the world, mediated by cell assemblies
> constituting basic qualia. [In passing; a quale must embody this triple
> aspect of representing something about the world, something about oneself
> and something significant about relationships *between* that piece of the
> world and that rendition of 'self'.]

Would any device that can create a representation of the world, itself and
the relationship between the world and itself be conscious? If you believe
that it would, then you are thereby very close to computationalism, the
thing you seem to be questioning.

Stathis Papaioannou

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