On 19 Feb, 18:48, "Jason" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Feb 19, 7:50 am, "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Pls see after Jason's remark
> > John
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: Jason
> > To: Everything List
> > Sent: Monday, February 19, 2007 3:42 AM
> > Subject: Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
> > On Feb 18, 5:46 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > On 2/18/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > My main problem with Comp is that it needs several unprovable
> > assumptions to
> > > > be accepted.
> > I believe that to say that some special substrate is needed for
> > consciousness, be it chemical reactions or anything else, is
> > subscribing to an epiphenominal view. For example, there should be no
> > difference in behavior between a brain that operates chemically and
> > one which has its chemical reactions simulated on a computer; however
> > if it is the chemicals themselves that are responsible for
> > consciousness, this consciousness can have no effect on the brain
> > because the net result will be identical whether the brain is
> > simulated or not. To me, epiphenominalism is a logical contradiction,
> > because if consciousness has no effect on the mind, we wouldn't wonder
> > about the mind-body problem because the mystery of consciousness would
> > have no way of communicating itself to the brain. Therefore, I don't
> > see how anything external to the functioning of the brain could be
> > responsible for consciousness.
> > Jason
> > -------------------------------
> > JM:
> > I think you are in a limitation and draw conclusions from this limited
> > model to beyond it.
> > Whatever we can 'simulate' is from within the up-to-date knowledge base:
> > our cognitive inventory. That is OK - and the way how humanity developed
> > over the eras of the epistemic enrichment since dawn. Topics are added and
> > views change as we learn more.
> > We are not (yet?) at the end with omniscience.
> > So our today's simulation is valid only to the extent of today's level of
> > knowables. Nobody can include the yet unknown into a simulation. (see the
> > remark of Stathis: "> You can't prove that a machine will be conscious in
> > the same way you are.")
> > If you insist of considering "the brain", it is OK with me (I go further
> > in my views into a total interconnection) but from even the brain you can
> > include into your simulation only what was learnt about it to date.
> > The computer cannot go beyond it either.
> > The brain does.
> > So our model-simulation is just that: a limited model.
> > Are we ready for surprizes?
> > John M
> Today I would agree, we probably don't know enough about the brain and
> physcis to make an accurate simulation, nor do we have anywhere near
> the computational power necessary for such a simulation. My point
> however is outside of that, it is:
> If you have two minds (one physical and one simulated) if their states
> evolve identically and indistinguishably then the simulation must be
> taking into account all necessary aspects related to the mind's
> functoning. If some unknown aspect of physics were responsible for
> consciousness in the physical mind but not the simulated one, it would
> be detected, as the simulation would diverge from the physical mind
> (assuming consciousness effects the brain, i.e. a non epiphenominal
> To put in another way, if consciousness effects the mind (which I
> think is necessary for us to be having this discussion), how could one
> have a perfect simulation if the simulation is not also concious? If
> one brain is conscious and there is a perfect simulation of it, the
> simulation must be conscious. Otherwise the effects of consciousness
> would cause a divergence in the simulation.
You need to distinguish between causal equivalence and functional
equivalence. Functional equivalence depends on a "mapping" that is in
the eye of the beholder. A perfect simualtion of an aircraft does not
fly (no causal equivalence). Instead we map different part ofthe
"ait", "wing", and so on (functoional equivalence).
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