On 19 Feb, 18:48, "Jason" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Feb 19, 7:50 am, "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Pls see after Jason's remark
> > John
> >   ----- Original Message -----
> >   From: Jason
> >   To: Everything List
> >   Sent: Monday, February 19, 2007 3:42 AM
> >   Subject: Re: Searles' Fundamental Error
> >   On Feb 18, 5:46 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >   > On 2/18/07, Mark Peaty <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >   > My main problem with Comp is that it needs several unprovable 
> > assumptions to
> >   > > be accepted.
> >   I believe that to say that some special substrate is needed for
> >   consciousness, be it chemical reactions or anything else, is
> >   subscribing to an epiphenominal view.  For example, there should be no
> >   difference in behavior between a brain that operates chemically and
> >   one which has its chemical reactions simulated on a computer; however
> >   if it is the chemicals themselves that are responsible for
> >   consciousness, this consciousness can have no effect on the brain
> >   because the net result will be identical whether the brain is
> >   simulated or not.  To me, epiphenominalism is a logical contradiction,
> >   because if consciousness has no effect on the mind, we wouldn't wonder
> >   about the mind-body problem because the mystery of consciousness would
> >   have no way of communicating itself to the brain.  Therefore, I don't
> >   see how anything external to the functioning of the brain could be
> >   responsible for consciousness.
> >   Jason
> >   -------------------------------
> >   JM:
> >   I think you are in a limitation and draw conclusions from this limited 
> > model to beyond it.
> >   Whatever we can 'simulate' is from within the up-to-date knowledge base: 
> > our cognitive inventory. That is OK  - and the way how humanity developed 
> > over the eras of the epistemic enrichment since dawn. Topics are added and 
> > views change as we learn more.
> >   We are not (yet?) at the end with omniscience.
> >   So our today's simulation is valid only to the extent of today's level of 
> > knowables. Nobody can include the yet unknown into a simulation. (see the 
> > remark of Stathis: "> You can't prove that a machine will be conscious in 
> > the same way you are.")
> >   If you insist of considering "the brain", it is OK with me (I go further 
> > in my views into  a total interconnection) but from even the brain you can 
> > include into your simulation only what was learnt about it to date.
> >   The computer cannot go beyond it either.
> >    The brain does.
> >   So our model-simulation is just that: a limited model.
> >   Are we ready for surprizes?
> >   John M
> John,
> Today I would agree, we probably don't know enough about the brain and
> physcis to make an accurate simulation, nor do we have anywhere near
> the computational power necessary for such a simulation.  My point
> however is outside of that, it is:
> If you have two minds (one physical and one simulated) if their states
> evolve identically and indistinguishably then the simulation must be
> taking into account all necessary aspects related to the mind's
> functoning.  If some unknown aspect of physics were responsible for
> consciousness in the physical mind but not the simulated one, it would
> be detected, as the simulation would diverge from the physical mind
> (assuming consciousness effects the brain, i.e. a non epiphenominal
> view)
> To put in another way, if consciousness effects the mind (which I
> think is necessary for us to be having this discussion), how could one
> have a perfect simulation if the simulation is not also concious?  If
> one brain is conscious and there is a perfect simulation of it, the
> simulation must be conscious.  Otherwise the effects of consciousness
> would cause a divergence in the simulation.

You need to distinguish between causal equivalence and functional
equivalence. Functional equivalence depends on a "mapping" that is in
the eye of the beholder. A perfect simualtion of an aircraft does not
fly (no causal equivalence). Instead we map different part ofthe
simulation onto
"ait", "wing", and so on (functoional equivalence).

> Jason

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