Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > Le 18-févr.-07, à 13:57, Mark Peaty a écrit : > > My main problem with Comp is that it needs several unprovable > assumptions to be accepted. For example the Yes Doctor hypothesis, > wherein it is assumed that it must be possible to digitally emulate > some or all of a person's body/brain function and the person will > not notice any difference. The Yes Doctor hypothesis is a particular > case of the digital emulation hypothesis in which it is asserted > that, basically, ANYTHING can be digitally emulated if one had > enough computational resources available. As this seems to me to be > almost a version of Comp [at least as far as I have got with reading > Bruno's exposition] then from my simple minded perspective it looks > rather like assuming the very thing that needs to be demonstrated. > > > > I disagree. The main basic lesson from the UDA is that IF I am a machine > (whatever I am) then the universe (whatever the universe is) cannot be a > machine. > Except if I am (literaly) the universe (which I assume to be false). > > If I survive classical teleportation, then the physical appearances > emerge from a randomization of all my consistent continuations,
What characterizes a consistent continuation? Does this refer to one's memory and self-identity or does it mean consistent with the unfolding of some algorithm or does it mean consistent with some physical "law" like unitary evolution in Hilbert space? >and this > is enough for explaining why comp predicts that the "physical > appearance" cannot be entirely computational (cf first person > indeterminacy, etc.). > > > You can remember it by a slogan: If I am a machine, then (not-I) is not > a machine. > > Of course something like "arithmetical truth" is not a machine, or > cannot be produced by a machine. > > Remember that one of my goal is to show that the comp hyp is refutable. > A priori it entails some highly non computable things, but then computer > science makes it less easy to refute quickly comp, and empiry (the > quantum) seems to assess comp, until now. > > > However, as far as I can see it is inherent in the nature of > consciousness to reify something. > > > Well, it depends what you mean by reifying. I take it as a high level > intellectual error. When a cat pursues a mouse, it plausible that the > cat believes in the mouse, and reify it in a sense. If that is your > sense of reifying, then I am ok with the idea that consciousness reifies > things. > But I prefer to use "reifying" more technically for making existing > something primitively, despite existence of phenomenological explanation. > > Let me be clear, because it could be confusing. A computationalist can > guess there is a universe, atoms, etc. He cannot remain consistent if he > believes the universe emerge from its parts, that the universe is made > of atoms, etc. You are saying that these beliefs entail a logical contradiction. What is that contradiction? Brent Meeker > > > I appreciate that the UDA and related treatments in mathematical > philosophy, can be rigorous, and enormously potent in their > implications for further speculation and development within their > universe of discourse, but I remain very sceptical of any advertised > potential to bootstrap the rest of the universe. > > > > I agree with you. But a thorough understanding of UDA would add > substance to your skepticism. With comp, the more we know about the > universe, the more we know we are ignorant about it. It is related with > the G* minus G gap. Although you can go from G (science) toward G* > (correct faith), when you do that, you will discover many genuine new > things, but the gap between G and G* will be made greater too. In > computerland, it is like each time you see a new star or galaxy, then > necessarily bigger things are forced to exist. The more you explore, the > more it remains to be explored, necessarily so. Understanding comp and > uda makes you infinitely more modest than we are used to think. > > I must go, > > Regards, > > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
