On 4/20/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

With ASSA/RSSA there is the assumption that there is a sampling, that
> of all observers (or observer moments) one is selected and
> experienced.  Consider momentarily, that no sampling was taking
> place?  Is this view consistent and valid?
> Note that by "no sampling" I mean no discrimination.  Instead of one
> oberserver or observer-moment being chosen, all are chosen and all are
> experienced.  In this regard the pronoun "you" becomes meaningless, it
> could be said that all perspectives are experienced by a single mind.
> When a person is born an observer is not created, rather the universe
> gains a new perspective upon itself.  The same is true in all the
> paradoxes of duplication/copying of observers.  Instead of there being
> a 50% chance of experiencing Washington or Moscow there is a 100%
> chance the universe perceives both viewpoints.
> I do not believe there would be any noticeable difference if this
> single mind experienced each observer-moment serially, simultanesouly,
> or each for eternally.  Although I think it is simpler to say every
> observer-moment is being experienced eternally, as each brain state
> exists eternally in platonia.  If this view happens to be consistent,
> then by Occam's razor it should be perferred over ASSA or RSSA since
> it does not require there be any sampling.

Even if there is in a sense just one mind perceiving all OM's simultaneously
(Platonia, the mind of God, the Universe), there is still the fact that the
OM in Washington does not directly share the experiences of its counterpart
in Moscow. If it did, then they would not be distinct OM's. From the third
person perspective, there is no mystery in duplication: where previously
there was one, now there are two. The paradoxes arise from the fact that we
have the sort of minds which consider that one OM has a particular
relationship to another OM, based partly, but not entirely, on memory. For
example, if I am to be copied tomorrow and one of the copies tortured, I am
worried, because I feel there is a 50% chance that I will be the one; but
come tomorrow, and I am not tortured, I am relieved, and feel pity for my
copy screaming in the next room. This doesn't really make sense: today I
anticipate being both copies, and neither copy has greater claim to being
"me" than the other, but tomorrow the situation is completely different. But
the subjective view doesn't have to make sense. It's just the way we think,
a contingent fact of evolution.

Stathis Papaioannou

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