Short comments to Jason, Marc and John.


I agree with the answers given by Russell and Stathis to your "one 
person idea" or single mind theory.
The "one person idea" (a recurring theme of the list)  is still 
coherent with comp, but most probably undecidable, and above all not 
relevant for testing comp (deriving the comp-physical laws).

Lee Corbin (I think in both the FOR list and the EVERYTHING list), but 
also David Chalmers (personal communication), were arguing that, after 
a Washington-Moscow duplication (with annihilation of the original in 
Brussels), they are simultaneously in W and in M. Honestly this could 
be just a matter of taste. But I told them that if we are in both W and 
M, then we most probably are *all* disconnected incarnation of the same 
person, going thus in your single mind theory direction. But here Lee 
and David seemed to disagree without justification. I think Lee changes 
his mind, or at least did understand the non-relevance of the single 
mind theory for the derivation of the physical laws from comp (or other 
"many-OMs" theories.

Single mind? Why not, indeed. It makes true one feature of Plotinus 
theory of evil, where all the bad you do to someone will be done to 
you. It is the good/bad conservation law. Plotinus dares to say: if a 
man rapes a woman, he will be reincarnated into a woman just to be 
raped. The one-person theory makes Plotinus principle true trivially 
without the need of explicit temporal-like reincarnations. I do like 
this idea.

But this is irrelevant for deriving the physical laws from the comp 
hyp, where you have to justify probability of families of 
result-experiences from what you guess about your actual state. In that 
case, you have to take into account the 1-3 person points of view 
distinction so that you can infer things like the fact that the 
probability of self-localization in Washington is 1/2, ... in the same 
way that you infer that the probability that your coffee will be cold 
is near one if you add enough cold milk. All that could be sort of 
illusions, but deriving the physics from comp consists justly in that: 
explaining where such illusions come from and why they are stable, and 
why does it hurt, etc.


I will comment Tegmark diagram asap.


I am still working on some of your posts, but I'm a bit busy, and I ask 
you to indulge for my lateness. Thanks.


Le 21-avr.-07, à 05:52, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

> On 4/21/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote (quoting Brent Meeker):
>> >
>> This seems to be a good definition for a person, but how does the
>> definition handle duplication thought experiments or the infinite
>> breadth of experiences across the multiverse which connects us all?
>> Personhood becomes fuzzy and a truly object treatment of conscious
>> experience might do well to abandon the idea of personal identity
>> altogether.  I agree there is not an extra-OM that experiences OMs,
>> but that seems to be what sampling assumptions imply.  
> I think of both personhood and personal identity as emergent 
> phenomena. It is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a 
> person that there exist a set of related moments of consciousness. 
> "Related" normally means that they arise in sequence as a result of 
> activity in a particular brain, but duplication thought experiments 
> suggest that a stream of consciousness can survive fragmentation of 
> the physical substrate. A person gets into teleportation machine A, is 
> destroyed, and a new person is created at receiving station B who 
> claims to be the same individual. This is simply a description of what 
> would happen if the experiment were performed, and "continuity of 
> personal identity" is a phrase commonly used to describe the 
> phenomenon.
> Stathis Papaioannou
>  >

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