David Nyman wrote: > On 23/06/07, *Russell Standish* <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote: > > RS: Perhaps you are one of those rare souls with a foot in > each camp. That could be be very productive! > > I hope so! Let's see... > > RS: This last post is perfectly lucid to me. > > Phew!! Well, that's a good start. > > RS: I hope I've answered it > adequately. > > Your answer is very interesting - not quite what I expected: > > RS: In some Platonic sense, all possible observers are already > out there, but by physically instantiating it in our world, we are in > effect opening up a communication channel between ourselves and the > new consciousness. > > I think I must be missing something profound in your intended meanings of: > > 1) 'out there' > 2) 'physically instantiating' > 3) 'our world' > > My current 'picture' of it is as follows. The 'Platonic sense' I assume > equates to the 'bit-string plenitude' (which is differentiable from 'no > information' only by internal observers, like the Library of Babel - a > beautiful idea BTW). But I'm assuming a 'hierarchy' of recursive > computational emergence through bits up through, say, strings, quarks, > atoms, molecules, etc - in other words what is perceived as > matter-energy by observers. I then assume that both 'physical objects' > and any correlated observers emerge from this matter-energy level, and > that this co-emergence accomplishes the 'physical instantiation'. IOW, > the observer is the 1-person view, and the physical behaviour the > 3-person view, of the same underlying complex emergent - they're > different descriptions of the same events. > > If this is so, then as you say, the opening of the 'communication > channel' would be a matter of establishing the means and modes of > interaction with any new consciousness, because the same seamless > underlying causal sequence unites observer-world and physical-world: > again, different descriptions, same events. > > If the above is accepted (but I'm beginning to suspect there's something > deeply wrong with it), then the 'stability' of the world of the observer > should equate to the 'stability' of the physical events to which it is > linked through *identity*. Now here's what puzzles me. ISTM that the > imputation of 'computation' to the physical computer is only through the > systematic correspondence of certain stable aspects of its (principally) > electronic behaviour to computational elements: numbers, > mathematical-logical operators, etc. The problem is in the terms > 'imputation' and 'correspondence': this is surely merely a *way of > speaking* about the physical events in the computer, an arbitrary > ascription, from an infinite possible set, of externally-established > semantics to the intrinsic physical syntactics. > > Consequently, ISTM that the emergence of observer-worlds has to be > correlated (somehow) - one-to-one, or isomorphically - with > corresponding 'physical' events: IOW these events, with their 'dual > description', constitute a single 'distinguished' *causal* sequence. By > contrast, *any* of the myriad 'computational worlds' that could be > ascribed to the same events must remain - to the computer, rather than > the programmer - only arbitrary or 'imaginary' ones. This is why I > described them as 'nested' - perhaps 'orthogonal' or 'imaginary' are > better: they may - 'platonically' - exist somewhere in the plenitude, > but causally disconnected from the physical world in which the computer > participates. The computer doesn't 'know' anything about them. > Consequently, how could they possess any 'communication channel' to the > computer's - and our - world 'out there'? > > Of course I'm not claiming by this that machines couldn't be conscious. > My claim is rather that if they are, it couldn't be solely in virtue of > any 'imaginary computational worlds' imputed to them, but rather because > they support some unique, distinguished process of *physical* emergence > that also corresponds to a unique observer-world: and of course, mutatis > mutandis, this must also apply to the 'mind-brain' relationship. > > If I'm wrong (as no doubt I am), ISTM I must have erred in some step or > other of my logic above. How do I debug it? > > David > > > > On Sat, Jun 23, 2007 at 03:58:39PM +0100, David Nyman wrote: > > On 23/06/07, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED] > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>> wrote: > > > > RS: I don't think I ever really found myself in > > disagreement with you. Rather, what is happening is symptomatic of us > > trying to reach across the divide of JP Snow's two cultures. You are > > obviously comfortable with the world of literary criticism, and your > > style of writing reflects this. The trouble is that to someone > brought > > up on a diet of scientific and technical writing, the literary paper > > may as well be written in ancient greek. Gibberish doesn't mean > > rubbish or nonsense, just unintelligible. > > > > DN: It's interesting that you should perceive it in this way: I > hadn't > > thought about it like this, but I suspect you're not wrong. I > haven't > > consumed very much of your 'diet', and I have indeed read quite a > lot of > > stuff in the style you refer to, although I often find it rather > > indigestible! But on the other hand, much of my professional > experience has > > been in the world of computer programming, right back to machine > code days, > > so I'm very aware of the difference between 'syntax' and > 'semantics', and I > > know too well how consequences can diverge wildly from a > difference of a > > single bit. How often have I heard the beleaguered self-tester > wail "I > > didn't *mean* that!" > > Interesting indeed. I wouldn't have guessed you to have been a > programmer. Perhaps you are one of those rare souls with a foot in > each camp. That could be be very productive! > > ... > > > > > However, in the spirit of the original topic of the thread, I > would prefer > > to ask you directly about the plausibility (which, unless I've > > misunderstood, you support?) of an AI-program being in principle > > 'conscious'. I take this to entail that instantiating such a program > > thereby implements an 'observer' that can respond to and share a > reality, in > > broadly the same terms, with human 'observers'. (I apologise in > advance if > > any paraphrase or short-hand I adopt misrepresents what you say > in TON): > > > > It seems plausible, certainly. > > > TON, as you comment in the book, takes the 'idealist' stance that > 'concrete' > > notions emerge from observation. Our own relative status as > observers > > participating in 'worlds' is then dependent on computational > 'emergence' > > from the plenitude of all possible bit-strings. Let's say that > I'm such an > > observer and I observe a 'computer' like the one I'm using now. The > > 'computer' is a 3-person 'concrete emergent' in my 1-person > world, and that > > of the 'plurality' of observers with whom I'm in relation: we can > 'interact' > > with it. Now, we collectively *impute* that some aspect of its > 3-person > > behaviour (e.g. EM phenomena in its internal circuitry) is to be > regarded as > > 'running an AI program' (i.e. ISTM that this is what happens when we > > 'compile and run' a program). In what way does such imputation > entail the > > evocation - despite the myriad possible 'concrete' instantiations > that might > > represent it - of a *stable* observer capable of participating in > our shared > > '1-person plural' context? IOW, I'm concerned that two different > categories > > are being conflated here: the 'world' at the 'observer level' > that includes > > me and the computer, and the 'world' of the program, which is > 'nested' > > inside this. How can this 'nested' world get any purchase on > 'observables' > > that are 'external' to it? > > > > It is no different to a conscious being instantiated in a new-born > baby (or 18 month old, or whenever babies actually become > conscious). In some Platonic sense, all possible observers are already > out there, but by physically instantiating it in our world, we are in > effect opening up a communication channel between ourselves and the > new consciousness. > > > As I re-read this question, I wonder whether I've already > willy-nilly fallen > > into the '2-cultures' gap again. But what I've asked seems to be > directly > > related to the issues raised by 'Olympia and Klara', and by the > substitution > > level dilemma posed by 'yes doctor'. Could you show me where - > or if - I go > > wrong, or does the 'language game' make our views forever mutually > > unintelligible? > > > > David > > > > This last post is perfectly lucid to me. I hope I've answered it > adequately. > > Cheers > > > -- > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Mathematics > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] > <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > >
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
