On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 10:17:57PM +0100, David Nyman wrote:
> Here's what's still not completely clear to me - perhaps you can assist me
> with this.  We don't know *which* set of physical events is in effect
> selected by the functionalist account, even though it may be reasonable to
> believe that there is one.  Given this, it appears that should we be finally
> convinced that only a functional account of 1-person phenomena uniquely
> survives all attempted refutation, we can never in that case provide any
> 'distinguished' bottom up physical account of the same phenomena.  IOW we
> would be faced with an irreducibly top-down mode of explanation for
> consciousness, even though there is still an ineliminable implication to
> specific fundamental aspects of the physics in 'instantiating' the bottom-up
> causality.  Does this indeed follow, or am I still garbling something?
> David

This sounds to me like you're paraphrasing Bruno's programme.

The only snag is how you can eliminate the possibility of a
non-functionalist model also explaining the same set of physical
laws. In fact the "God did it" model probably indicates this can't be done.

A/Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
UNSW SYDNEY 2052                         [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australia                                http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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