On Aug 28, 5:18 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>
> I don't find your arguments at all convincing.  In fact I don't think you've 
> even given an argument - just assertions.


Here  the points of a clear-cut argument.  These are not 'just
assertions':


(1) Mathematical concepts are indispensible to our explanations of
reality.

(2) If something is indispensible to our explanation to the simplest
(most likely) position is that the concept is objectively real
(See David Deutch, 'Criteria for existence', 'Mathematical Platonism'
and 'Argument From indispensibility')

(3)  From (1) and (2) mathematical concepts are objectively real.

(4) There is an essential difference between specific objectively
measurable concepts (as for instance in the case of 'circulation') and
mental concepts.  The difference is that mental processes are
*patterns* (See 'Functionalism') and patterns don't rely on specific
physical properties (for instance clouds, bricks, computers or
anything) could all be conscious if they enacted the right pattern.
So subjective experiences are *patterns*.  And patterns cannot be
objectively measured in the way that specific physical properties can
(See Ray Kurweil 'The Singularity Is Near' for agreement of this).

(5)  Patterns are mathematical in nature.

(6)  Subjective experiences are patterns (from 4).  Therefore
subjective experiences are mathematical properties (from 5).

(7)  From (3) mathematical concepts are objectively real.  But there
exist mathematical concepts (inifinite sets) which cannot be explained
in terms of finite physical processes.  Therefore mathematical
concepts cannot be reduced to material processes.  They abstract (non-
material) but objectively real things.

(8)  From (6) subjective experiences are mathematical properties.
>From (7) mathematical properties are abstract (non-material).
Therefore subjective experiences are non-material properties.




--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Reply via email to