> One thing I still don't understand, is in what sense exactly is the "Measure
> Problem" a problem? Why isn't it good enough to say that everything exists,
> therefore we (i.e. people living in a lawful universe) must exist, and
> therefore we shouldn't be surprised that we exist. If the "Measure Problem"
> is a problem, then why isn't there also an analogous "Lottery Problem" for
> people who have won the lottery?
thank you Wei Dei, I have expressed something similar concerning the
Doomsday Argument which has the same reasoning flaw.
You can't reason about probabilities "inside" the system and be
surprised that you are in "location" A or B.
1) If I draw from an urn with 1 Million white balls and 1 black ball, I
should be pretty surprised if I draw the black one.
2) If I am a black ball in an urn (same distribution as above) and I
only become conscious if I am drawn and I suddenly "wake up" to find
myself drawn, I shouldn't be surprised at all - my being drawn was a
condition for being a perceptive being.
I think a mixing up of these two viewpoints underly much of "measure
problem", doomsday and other arguments of the same sort.
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
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