On Oct 30, 2008, at 3:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Of course the point is that you're not the same "you"
> from moment to moment in the sense of strict identity of information
> down to the
> molecular level, or even the neuron level.
I agree, but that doesn't change the point I was trying to make. If
the collection of molecules that comes out the other end of the
teleporter is not identical to me, but it's as much like me as any
normal future collection of molecules that I change into moment-by-
moment, then I believe that my identity "completely survived" the
teleportation. (In the same sense that I "completely survive" an
average day of my normal life.) If the collection of molecules that
comes out the other end of the teleporter is a puddle of goo, I
believe that my identity completely failed to survive the teleportation.
My point is that "completely survived" and "completely failed to
survive" cannot be the only two possible cases. If it was, we'd be
left with the absurd conclusion that there's a single molecule of
difference between cases in which I completely survive and cases in
which I completely fail to survive.
My further point was that this has a bearing on probability when
creating multiple copies. If I make two copies of myself A and B, and
A is an identical copy (or close enough, as above) while B is one of
those weird intermediate cases, I must believe that subjectively I'm
more likely to find myself at A. Otherwise, we'd again be left with
the absurd conclusion that there's a molecule of difference between
the cases when I fully survive both copyings, and the ones where I
completely fail to survive the B copying and therefore am certain to
find myself at A.
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