Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2008/10/31 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>> On Oct 30, 2008, at 3:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>> Of course the point is that you're not the same "you"
>>> from moment to moment in the sense of strict identity of information
>>> down to the
>>> molecular level, or even the neuron level.
>> I agree, but that doesn't change the point I was trying to make. If
>> the collection of molecules that comes out the other end of the
>> teleporter is not identical to me, but it's as much like me as any
>> normal future collection of molecules that I change into moment-by-
>> moment, then I believe that my identity "completely survived" the
>> teleportation. (In the same sense that I "completely survive" an
>> average day of my normal life.) If the collection of molecules that
>> comes out the other end of the teleporter is a puddle of goo, I
>> believe that my identity completely failed to survive the teleportation.
>> My point is that "completely survived" and "completely failed to
>> survive" cannot be the only two possible cases. If it was, we'd be
>> left with the absurd conclusion that there's a single molecule of
>> difference between cases in which I completely survive and cases in
>> which I completely fail to survive.
> Why is this absurd ? You are composed of a finite number of
> molecule... it seems therefore logical that between you still feel as
> yourself and there is no more you... there is only one bit of
> Quentin Anciaux
Why is "feeling yourself" dichotomous? What if you feel and act as
usual but you think your name is "Kory" instead of "Quentin". What if
you remember the childhood of Bruno as yours and you are very
knowledgeable about modal logic.
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