Sorry for the long delay on this reply. On Nov 2, 2008, at 7:04 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > Kory Heath wrote: >> In this mundane sense, it's perfectly sensible for me to say, as I'm >> sitting here typing this email, "I expect to still be sitting in this >> room one second from now". If I'm about to step into a teleporter >> that's going to obliterate me and make a perfect copy of me in a >> distant blue room, how can it not be sensible to ask - in that >> mundane, everyday sense - "What do I expect to be experiencing one >> second from now?" > It's sensible to ask because in fact there is no teleporter or > duplicator or simulator that can provide the continuity of experiences > that is Kory. So the model in which your consciousness is a single > unified "thing" works. But there are hypothetical cases in which it > doesn't make sense, or at least its sense is somewhat arbitrary.
If something like the many-worlds interpretation of quantum physics is correct, then this kind of duplication is actually happening to me all the time. But I should still be able to ask a question like, "What do I expect to be experiencing one second from now?", and the answer should still be "I expect to still be sitting at this computer, typing this email." If the many-worlds theory simply disallows me from making statements like that, then there's something wrong with the many- worlds theory. But if the many-worlds theory *allows* me to make statements like that, then in that same sense, I should be able to ask "What am I about to experience?" when I step into a duplicating machine. -- Kory --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---