# Re: QTI & euthanasia

```But, given that they are processes, then by definition they are
characterised by changing states. If we have some uncertainty regarding the
exact mechanics of that process, or the external input, then we can draw an
extradimensional state-space in which the degrees of uncertainty correspond
to new variables. If we can try and place bounds on the uncertainty then we
can certainly produce a kind of probability mapping as to future states of
the process.```
```

2008/11/2 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

>
> Kory Heath wrote:
> > On Oct 31, 2008, at 1:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >
> >> I think this problem is misconceived as being about probability of
> >> survival.
> >>
> >
> > In the case of simple teleportation, I agree. If I step into a
> > teleporter, am obliterated at one end, and come out the other end
> > "changed" - missing a bunch of memories, personality traits, etc., it
> > doesn't seem quite correct to ask the question, "what's the
> > probability that that person is me?" It seems more correct to ask
> > something like "what percentage of 'me' is that person?" And in fact,
> > this is the point I've been trying to make all along - that we have to
> > accept some spectrum of cases between "the collection of molecules
> > that came out is 100% me" and "the collection of molecules that came
> > out is 0% me".
> >
> > The idea of probability enters the picture (or seems to) when we start
> > talking about multiple copies. If I step into a teleporter, am
> > obliterated, and out of teleporter A steps a copy that's 100% me and
> > out of teleporter B steps a copy that's 10% me, what's the best way to
> > view this situation? Subjectively, what should I believe that I'm
> > about to experience as I step into that teleporter? It's hard for me
> > that I'm more likely to find myself at A than B. It's especially hard
> > for me not to think in these terms when I consider that, in the case
> > when the thing that ends up in teleporter A is 100% me and the thing
> > that ends up in teleporter B is 0% me, the answer is unambiguous: I
> > should simply believe that I'm going to subjectively experience ending
> > up in teleporter A.
> >
> > I'm sympathetic to the argument that it's still not correct to frame
> > this problem in terms of probability. But I don't understand how else
> > to frame it. How do you (Brent) frame the problem? Subjectively, what
> > should I expect to experience (or feel that I'm most likely to
> > experience) when I step into a teleporter, and I know that the thing
> > that's going to come out Receiver A will be 100% me and the thing
> > that's going to come out of Receiver B will be 10% me?
> >
> > -- Kory
> >
> The way I look at it, there is no "I".  Kory-A and Kory-B are just two
> different processes.  We can ask how similar each one is to the Kory
> that stepped into the teleporter, but there's no fact of the matter
> about which one is *really* Kory.  And there's no sense to the question
> of what "I should expect to experience" because "I" is nothing but a
> process of experiencing anyway.  We could make up some legal rule (which
> we would need if there really were teleporters) but it would have to be
> based on it's social utility, not ontology.
>
> Brent
>
> >
>

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