On Nov 14, 2008, at 5:09 PM, Michael Rosefield wrote: > Take this level of abstraction much further and what you have > essentially is the 'dust theory' from Greg Egan's Permutation City.
Actually, I think my formulation already goes further than the theory outlined in PC. Although it's a subtle point, I get the feeling that reality in PC is still "materialist", in the sense that at the root there still is material stuff which is different than bare mathematical fact. I think the idea is more like the idea that a physical stone implements all possible computations. As long as there's some physical stuff to work with (implies the novel), that stuff is enough to represent all possible computations. And the computations representing conscious beings are scattered like dust throughout those computations. Another way to look at it would be to say that, if the physical universe is infinite, then at the moment of my death, there is some pattern of molecules somewhere which is enough like me to count as a continuer. It doesn't matter that it's causally disconnected from me. Those states may be scattered like dust through space and time, but as long as they're there, I'll continue to exist. One can believe all of this, yet still retain the standard (in my opinion ill-formed) materialist conception of physical existence. One can still believe that some kind of physical universe has to exist in order for the "dust" to exist. It's different (and more extreme) to suggest that mathematical facts-of-the-matter by themselves play the role that "physical existence" is supposed to play. Maybe Egan did mean to imply that more extreme version, but it's hard to know, because he wrote a novel rather than a concise essay. For instance, I don't understand why the main character of the novel felt the need to "jump start" the universe he wanted by performing the initial computations. If the dust theory is true, nothing needs to be jump-started. -- Kory --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
