On 14 Nov 2008, at 01:19, Kory Heath wrote:

> On Nov 13, 2008, at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will
>> have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember
>> that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be
>> it soft or hard wired).
> Good point. What's the most concise way to say it? "I believe that
> persons represented by unimplemented computations are conscious"?

Hmmm... I am afraid this is not yet OK, but take it easy, it helps to  
realize the presence of some difficulties here. I got the same  
impression with the discussion about zombie.

For someone who believes explicitly in naturalism or materialism, all  
your definitions are correct (and will be used in the MGA reduction ad  
absurdo which will follow). But now we can "redefined", or even just  
*use* the *same definition* (of term like zombie, or implementation)  
without interpreting them necessarily in a materialist background.

For example, a zombie is just some entity which looks like you and me,  
i.e. has all the appearance of a human, and who has no consciousness.   
There is no *need* to make them a priori fundamentally material. Now a  
materialist can and even should interpret this as a zombie in the  
sense of Dennett, but the definition continues to make sense for a non  
materialist, who for example just consider itself that physics is  
implemented or emerge from something else. It shows that the notion of  
zombie does not depend on the materialist or non materialist belief. A  
zombie is just something NON conscious despite it has all the  
appearance of a human like you and me (and thus is material for a  
materialist, and immaterial for an immaterialist).

The same for implementation or incarnation, or instantiation of a  
program or an idea. A materialist will interpret (by default) the term  
as "material implementation", but a non materialist can still believe  
in the (very important of course) notion of implementation, even of  
sort of quasi-"material" implementation: this would mean for him/her  
"implementation in or relatively to the most probable computations".

So we agree that a computation is not conscious.
That only a person can be conscious (accepting that eventually we have  
to make the notion of person a bit more precise)

Now a computationalist cannot say "I believe that persons represented  
by unimplemented computations are conscious" for the reason that all  
computations have to be implemented". Indeed, most computer programmer  
used the term "implementation" followed by "in Fortran" (or java,  
lisp, etc.).

A machine A can implement machine B, when there is a number (program)  
x such that the machine Ax behaves like B. Universal machine are  
machine capable of implementing all machines.

(and UDA+MGA shows the necessity of something like  "arithmetic  
implement all universal machines whose "dreams" (sharable first person  
stories) cohere into "physical histories" which then locally implement  
these universal machine into person.

To economize conflict of words it is useful to put large  
interpretation of those words, so that we can extract the genuine  
difference of understandings. A zombie is material only for someone  
who take for granted matter, like an implementation is material only  
if you take matter fro granted.

I think I could be clearer. But I will stop here.  Except for:

>> Perhaps the time has come I explain the MGA on the list? Would you be
>> interested? It seems that both you and Stathis already accept the
>> conclusion. So ...
> No need to do it just on my account, but yes, I'm interested.

With pleasure.. Thanks for telling me. I have no more choice  
apparently! I will think about and send MGA step 1, .... asap.


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