Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 19 Nov 2008, at 16:06, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > >> Bruno, >> >>> If no one objects, I will present MGA 2 (soon). >> I also agree completely and am curious to see where this is going. >> Please continue! > > > Thanks Telmo, thanks also to Gordon. > > I will try to send MGA 2 asap. But this asks me some time. Meanwhile I > suggest a little exercise, which, by the way, finishes the proof of > "MECH + MAT implies false", for those who thinks that there is no > (conceivable) zombies. (they think that "exists zombie" *is* false). > > Exercise (mat+mec implies zombie exists or are conceivable): > > Could you alter the so-lucky cosmic explosion beam a little bit so > that Alice still succeed her math exam, but is, reasonably enough, a > zombie during the exam. With zombie taken in the traditional sense of > Kory and Dennett. > Of course you have to keep well *both* MECH *and* MAT. > > Bruno
As I understand it a philosophical zombie is someone who looks and acts just like a conscious person but isn't conscious, i.e. has no "inner narrative". Time and circumstance play a part in this. As Bruno pointed out a cardboard cutout of a person's photograph could be a zombie for a moment. I assume the point of the exam is that an exam is long enough in duration and complex enough that it rules out the accidental, cutout zombie. But then Alice has her normal behavior restored by a cosmic ray shower that is just as improbable as the accidental zombie, i.e. she is, for the duration of the shower, an accidental zombie. So I'm puzzled as to how answer Bruno's question. In general I don't believe in zombies, but that's in the same way I don't believe my glass of water will freeze at 20degC. It's an opinion about what is likely, not what is possible. It seems similar to the question, could I have gotten in my car and driven to the store, bought something, and driven back and yet not be conscious of it. It's highly unlikely, yet people apparently have done such things. Brent --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
