Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 19 Nov 2008, at 16:06, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>> Bruno,
>>> If no one objects, I will present MGA 2 (soon).
>> I also agree completely and am curious to see where this is going.
>> Please continue!
> Thanks Telmo, thanks also to Gordon.
> I will try to send MGA 2 asap. But this asks me some time. Meanwhile I  
> suggest a little exercise, which, by the way, finishes the proof of  
> "MECH + MAT implies false", for those who thinks that there is no  
> (conceivable) zombies. (they think that "exists zombie" *is* false).
> Exercise (mat+mec implies zombie exists or are conceivable):
> Could you alter the so-lucky cosmic explosion beam a little bit so  
> that Alice still succeed her math exam, but is, reasonably enough, a  
> zombie  during the exam. With zombie taken in the traditional sense of  
> Kory and Dennett.
> Of course you have to keep well *both*  MECH *and* MAT.
> Bruno

As I understand it a philosophical zombie is someone who looks and acts just 
like a conscious person but isn't conscious, i.e. has no "inner narrative". 
Time and circumstance play a part in this.  As Bruno pointed out a cardboard 
cutout of a person's photograph could be a zombie for a moment.  I assume the 
point of the exam is that an exam is long enough in duration and complex enough 
that it rules out the accidental, cutout zombie.  But then Alice has her normal 
behavior restored by a cosmic ray shower that is just as improbable as the 
accidental zombie, i.e. she is, for the duration of the shower, an accidental 

So I'm puzzled as to how answer Bruno's question.  In general I don't believe 
zombies, but that's in the same way I don't believe my glass of water will 
freeze at 20degC.  It's an opinion about what is likely, not what is possible. 
It seems similar to the question, could I have gotten in my car and driven to 
the store, bought something, and driven back and yet not be conscious of it. 
It's highly unlikely, yet people apparently have done such things.


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