On 21 Nov 2008, at 10:45, Kory Heath wrote:
> However, the materialist-mechanist still has some grounds to say that > there's something interestingly different about Lucky Kory than > Original Kory. It is a physical fact of the matter that Lucky Kory is > not causally connected to Pre-Teleportation Kory. When someone asks > Lucky Kory, "Why do you tie your shoes that way?", and Lucky Kory > says, "Because of something I learned when I was ten years old", Lucky > Kory's statement is quite literally false. Lucky Kory ties his shoes > that way because of some cosmic rays. I actually don't know what the > standard mechanist-materialist way of viewing this situation is. But > it does seem to suggest that maybe breaks in the causal chain > shouldn't affect consciousness after all. You are right, at least when, for the sake of the argument, we continue to keep MEC and MAT, if only to single out, the most transparently possible, the contradiction. Let us consider your "lucky teleportation case", where someone use a teleporter which fails badly. So it just annihilates the "original" person, but then, by an incredible luck the person is reconstructed with his right state after. If you ask him "how do you know how to tie shoes", if the person answers, after that bad but lucky "teleportation" "because I learn in my youth": he is correct. He is correct for the same reason Alice's answer to her exams were correct, even if luckily so. Suppose I send you a copy of my sane paper by the internet, and that, the internet demolishes it completely, but that by an incredible chance your buggy computer rebuild it in its exact original form. This will not change the content of the paper, and the paper will be correct or false independently of the way it has flight from me to you. In the bad-lucky teleporter case, even with MAT (and MEC) it is still the right person who survived, with the correct representation of her right memories, and so one. Even if just "luckily so". MGA 2 then shows that the random appearance of the lucky event was a red hearing, so that we have to admit that consciousness supervenes on the movie graph (the movie of the running of the boolean optical computer). Of course I don't believe that consciousness supervene on the physical activity of such movie, but this means that I have to abandon the whole physical supervenience. I will read the other posts. I think many have understood and have already concluded. But from a strict logical point of view, perhaps some are willing to defend the idea that the movie-graph is conscious, and, in that case, I will present MGA 3, which is supposed to show that, well, a movie cannot think, through MEC (there is just no computation there). Of course, the movie has still some relationship with the original consciousness of Alice, and this will help us to save the MEC part of the physical supervenience thesis, giving rise to the notion of "computational supervenience", but this form of supervenience does no more refer to anything *primarily* physical, and this will be enough preventing the use of a concrete universe for blocking the UDA conclusion. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
