On 21 Nov 2008, at 10:45, Kory Heath wrote:
> > ... > A much closer analogy to Lucky Alice would be if the doctor > accidentally destroys me without making the copy, turns on the > receiving teleporter in desperation, and then the exact copy that > would have appeared anyway steps out, because (luckily!) cosmic rays > hit the receiver's mechanisms in just the right way. I actually find > this thought experiment more persuasive than Lucky Alice (although I'm > sure some will argue that they're identical). At the very least, the > mechanist-materialist has to say that the resulting Lucky Kory is > conscious. I think it's also clear that Lucky Kory's consciousness > must be exactly what it would have been if the teleportation had > worked correctly. This does in fact lead me to feel that maybe > causality shouldn't have any bearing on consciousness after all. Very good. Thanks. > > > However, the materialist-mechanist still has some grounds to say that > there's something interestingly different about Lucky Kory than > Original Kory. It is a physical fact of the matter that Lucky Kory is > not causally connected to Pre-Teleportation Kory. Keeping the comp hyp (cf the "qua computatio") this would introduce magic. > When someone asks > Lucky Kory, "Why do you tie your shoes that way?", and Lucky Kory > says, "Because of something I learned when I was ten years old", Lucky > Kory's statement is quite literally false. Lucky Kory ties his shoes > that way because of some cosmic rays. I actually don't know what the > standard mechanist-materialist way of viewing this situation is. But > it does seem to suggest that maybe breaks in the causal chain > shouldn't affect consciousness after all. Yes. > ..... > Of course I'm entirely on board with the spirit of your thought > experiment. You think MECH and MAT implies that Lucky Alice is > conscious, but I don't think it does. I'm not sure how important that > difference is. It seems substantial. But I can also predict where > you're going with your thought experiment, and it's the exact same > place I go. So by all means, continue on to MGA 2, and we'll see what > happens. Thanks. A last comment on your reply on Stathis' recent comment. Stathis argument, based on Chalmers' fading qualia is mainly correct I think. And it could be that your answer to Stathis is correct too. And this would finish our work. We would have a proof that Telmo Alice is uncouscious and that Telmo Alice is conscious, finishing the reductio ad absurbo. Keep in mind that we are doing a reductio ad absurdo. Those who are convinced by bith Stathis and Russell Telmo, ... can already take holidays! Have to write MGA 2 for the others. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
