On 21 Nov 2008, at 10:45, Kory Heath wrote:

>
> ...
> A much closer analogy to Lucky Alice would be if the doctor
> accidentally destroys me without making the copy, turns on the
> receiving teleporter in desperation, and then the exact copy that
> would have appeared anyway steps out, because (luckily!) cosmic rays
> hit the receiver's mechanisms in just the right way. I actually find
> this thought experiment more persuasive than Lucky Alice (although I'm
> sure some will argue that they're identical). At the very least, the
> mechanist-materialist has to say that the resulting Lucky Kory is
> conscious. I think it's also clear that Lucky Kory's consciousness
> must be exactly what it would have been if the teleportation had
> worked correctly. This does in fact lead me to feel that maybe
> causality shouldn't have any bearing on consciousness after all.


Very good. Thanks.


>
>
> However, the materialist-mechanist still has some grounds to say that
> there's something interestingly different about Lucky Kory than
> Original Kory. It is a physical fact of the matter that Lucky Kory is
> not causally connected to Pre-Teleportation Kory.


Keeping the comp hyp (cf the "qua computatio") this would introduce  
magic.



> When someone asks
> Lucky Kory, "Why do you tie your shoes that way?", and Lucky Kory
> says, "Because of something I learned when I was ten years old", Lucky
> Kory's statement is quite literally false. Lucky Kory ties his shoes
> that way because of some cosmic rays. I actually don't know what the
> standard mechanist-materialist way of viewing this situation is. But
> it does seem to suggest that maybe breaks in the causal chain
> shouldn't affect consciousness after all.

Yes.

> .....
> Of course I'm entirely on board with the spirit of your thought
> experiment. You think MECH and MAT implies that Lucky Alice is
> conscious, but I don't think it does. I'm not sure how important that
> difference is. It seems substantial. But I can also predict where
> you're going with your thought experiment, and it's the exact same
> place I go. So by all means, continue on to MGA 2, and we'll see what
> happens.


Thanks.  A last comment on your reply on Stathis' recent comment.

Stathis argument, based on Chalmers' fading qualia is mainly correct I  
think. And it could be that your answer to Stathis is correct too.
And this would finish our work. We would have a proof that Telmo Alice  
is uncouscious and that Telmo Alice is conscious, finishing the  
reductio ad absurbo.
Keep in mind that we are doing a reductio ad absurdo. Those who are  
convinced by bith Stathis and Russell Telmo, ...  can already take  
holidays!

Have to write MGA 2 for the others.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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