Si nisi non esset perfectum quodlibet esset (if "IF" not existed everything would be perfect.
Maybe I am a partial zombie for these things. (Mildly said). John M On Thu, Nov 27, 2008 at 4:36 PM, Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > On Nov 26, 2008, at 5:29 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Yes. Suppose one of the components in my computer is defective but, > > with incredible luck, is outputting the appropriate signals due to > > thermal noise. Would it then make sense to say that the computer isn't > > "really" running Firefox, but only pretending to do so, reproducing > > the Firefox behaviour but lacking the special Firefox > > qualia-equivalent? > > It seems to me that this reasoning creates just as serious a problem > for your perspective as it does for mine. Suppose we physically remove > the defective component from the computer, but, with incredible luck, > the surrounding components continue to act as though they were > receiving the signals they would have received. Your experience of > using Firefox remains the same, so (by your argument above) it > shouldn't make sense to say that the computer isn't "really" running > Firefox. But we can keep removing components until all that's left is > a monitor that, with incredible luck due to thermal noise, is > displaying the pixels that would have been displayed if your computer > was actually functioning, doing things like displaying a mouse-pointer > that (very improbably!) happens to move when you move your mouse, etc. > > This is, of course, just a recapitulation of the argument we've > already been considering - the slide from Fully-Functional Alice to > Lucky Alice to Empty-Headed Alice. I have an intuition that causality > (or its logical equivalent in Platonia) is somehow important for > consciousness. You argue that the the slide from Fully-Functional > Alice to Lucky Alice (or Fully-Functional Firefox to Lucky Firefox) > indicates that there's something wrong with this idea. However, you > have an intuition that order is somehow important for consciousness. > (Without trying to beg the question, I might use the term "mere > order", to indicate the fact that, for you, it doesn't matter whether > the blinking bits in some hypothetical 2D array were generated by > (say) a random process, it just matters that they display the > requisite order.) But the slide from Lucky Alice to Empty-Headed Alice > is just as problematic for that view as the slide from Fully- > Functional Alice to Lucky Alice is for mine. > > My point isn't that your intuition must be incorrect. My point is that > the above argument fails to show me why your "mere order" intuition is > more correct than my "real order" intuition, since the argument is > equally destructive to both intuitions. Instead of giving up your > intuition, you make a move to Platonia. But in that new context, I > think it still makes sense to ask if "mere order" (for instance, in > the binary digits of PI) is enough for consciousness, and the Alice / > Firefox thought experiments don't help me answer that question. > > > If by "Unification" you mean the idea that two identical brains with > > identical input will result in only one consciousness, I don't see how > > this solves the conceptual problem of partial zombies. What would > > happen if an identical part of both brains were replaced with a > > non-concious but otherwise identically functioning equivalent? > > I was referring to the idea that my Conway's Life version of Bruno's > MGA 2 may only present a problem for Duplicationists. If one believes > that physically re-performing all of the Conway's Life computations > would create a second experience of pain (assuming that there's a > creature in there with that description), and if you *don't* believe > that the act of playing the move back creates a second experience of > pain, then you have a partial zombie problem. But it you accept > Unification, the problem might go away (although I'm unsure of this). > > I still feel like I don't have a handle on how you feel the move to > Platonia solves these problems. If we imagine the mathematical > description of filling a 3D grid with the binary digits of PI, > somewhere within it we will find some patterns of bits that look as > though they're following the rules to Conway's Life. If we see > creatures in there, would they be conscious? What about the areas in > that grid where we find the equivalent of Empty-Headed Alice, where > most of the cells seem to be "following the rules" of Conway's Life, > but the section where a creature's "visual cortex" ought to be is just > filled with zeros? In other words, why doesn't the "partial zombie" > problem still exist for us in Platonia? > > -- Kory > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
